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This project examines the evolution of President Raúl Alfonsín’s human rights policies 
from his candidacy to his presidency. Alfonsín’s election in 1983 followed Argentina’s most 
repressive dictatorship and marked the country’s return to democracy. This democratic transition 
occurred at the beginning of a wave of similar shifts from military to civilian rule throughout 
Latin America. As a result, the Argentine experience heavily influenced the transitional justice 
scholarship that emerged in the 1990s. Argentina pioneered new methods of addressing state 
sponsored human rights violations during Alfonsín’s administration. Never Again, the first 
published truth commission report became an international model, and more than thirty countries 
have followed Argentina’s example since 1983. Alfonsín also ordered criminal prosecution of 
military generals for human rights violations. The trials respected legal codes and due process in 
order to demonstrate the law’s ability to address wrongdoing. Such efforts helped reestablish 
trust in judicial processes. These mechanisms applied early in Alfonsín’s term revolutionized the 
field of transitional justice, but the later years of his presidency limited this initial momentum 
toward accountability through the authorization of Full Stop and Due Obedience laws. Both 
measures, dictated under military pressure, narrowed the scope of the trials in order to ensure 
democratic stability. President Alfonsín had dedicated himself to overcoming Argentina’s legacy 
of authoritarianism and emphasized democratization as the main goal of the country’s transition. 
No president had completed his or her mandate against the wishes of the armed forces since 
 v 
1928. In light of these political realities, Alfonsín made prudent decisions to achieve his 
legislative goals without undermining democratic processes and institutions. This approach 
marked a clear break with the past and sought to model democratic governance. Alfonsín’s 
methods also demonstrated that democracy, even when producing complicated and uneven 
policy victories, had the power to address social problems. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
By late 1982, Argentina’s military generals looked to exit politics. They vowed to 
transfer power to an elected civilian president by January 1984. A series of political blunders by 
the generals had motivated this promise, but the military hoped to negotiate a favorable 
transition. As the armed forces tried to place conditions on the electoral process, voices of protest 
grew stronger. More than 100,000 people marched through the streets of Buenos Aries on 
December 16, 1982. Leaders of the country’s major political parties and human rights 
organizations had called on Argentines to join them in denouncing the military dictatorship and 
demanding free and fair elections.1 The demonstration, known as the People’s March for 
Democracy and National Reconstruction, followed several weeks of strikes and protests. Rising 
inflation, massive human rights abuses, and humiliating defeat in a war with Great Britain 
motivated the unrest in provinces throughout the country.2  
 In nearly seven years of military rule, Argentina had never seen such a large anti-
government rally. Protestors shouted their contempt for the military generals: “Up against the 
wall, all the brass who sold the country.”3 When they reached Plaza de Mayo, a small minority of 
demonstrators threw rocks at police and nearby buildings. Organizers quickly lost control of the 
rally, which they intended as a peaceful demonstration. Law enforcement responded by firing 
tear gas and blank charges into the crowd. In the ensuing chaos, protestors attempted to flee the 
 
1 “More than 100,000 Turn Up,’” Buenos Aires DYN (December 16, 1982), Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, FBIS-LAM-82-243, December 17, 1982, B1. 
2 Germán Ferrari, 1983: El año de la democracia (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Planeta, 2013), 13. 
3 Jackson Diehl, “Protest March in Argentina Turns Violent,” The Washington Post, December 17, 1982.  
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plaza but found themselves trapped. Mounted officers had blocked the side streets and beat back 
the crowds.4 The event ended in one death, eighty injured, and one hundred and twenty arrests.5 
Government forces managed to suppress the demonstrators by force, but the march 
signaled the military’s waning power. The armed forces had governed Argentina since March 24, 
1976 when the military had overthrown President Isabel Perón and declared a war on subversion. 
In this so-called Dirty War, the armed forces implemented a system of kidnapping, torture, and 
murder. An estimated 22,000 people disappeared during the first two years of the junta, and 
human rights groups place the total figure of disappeared at 30,000.6 High levels of repression 
limited public dissent in the early years of the dictatorship, but the protests of 1982 indicated a 
renewed willingness to challenge the military junta.   
 During the 1980s, the army’s power gradually weakened as the economy plunged into a 
deep recession. The military had promised to transform the economy by reducing state 
intervention and restoring investor confidence.7 The junta initiated a five-year stabilization plan, 
which aimed to force a gradual devaluation of the peso, reduce trade barriers, and promote 
foreign investment. In practice, these measures caused deindustrialization and a sharp decline in 
salaries. Workers’ real income had dropped to less than half of the 1974 levels by the end of 
 
4 Liliana Garulli, Los desafíos de la transición democrática, 1983-1989 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de 
Buenos Aires, 2011), 20. 
5 “Breaking Away; Day of Defiance in Argentina,” The New York Times, December 19, 1982.  
6 Enrique Arancibia Clavel to Chilean National Intelligence Directorate, “Argentine Military Intelligence Estimates 
22,000 People Dead or Disappeared,” Buenos Aires, July 1978, On 30th Anniversary of Argentine Coup New 
Declassified Details on Repression and U.S. Support for Military Dictatorship, ed. Carlos Osorio, Marcos Novaro, 
and John Dinges (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 2006), Digital National Security Archive 
accession number A0000514. 
7 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 54.  
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September 1976.8 For the remainder of the dictatorship, real wages experienced almost no 
growth.9 Inflation was approximately 200 percent while unemployment hovered around 10 to 12 
percent by 1982.10 Foreign debt totaled more than forty-five billion dollars, and economic issues 
began to dwarf nearly all other concerns.11 
 With the economy in decline and public discontent becoming more evident, the military 
junta embarked on another disastrous plan. The armed forces announced the invasion of the 
Malvinas Islands, thus starting a war with Great Britain on April 2, 1982. Although Argentina 
had not controlled the islands since the British invasion in 1830, the military junta framed the 
conflict as a “recovery” of Argentine lands and hoped to galvanize society behind a nationalistic 
cause.12 The mission resulted in a swift defeat in June 1982, and the Argentine forces suffered in 
excess of 700 casualties and 1,000 wounded.  
 The Malvinas War, ending in disgrace, marked the close of the military’s time in power. 
The recklessness of the conflict sparked public outrage. “The armed forces have even failed in 
the one thing that they are specifically trained to do: fight a war,” criticized a local journalist.13 
Rather than improve the military’s image, the Malvinas War added to mounting evidence of the 
armed forces’ inability to govern. The generals’ incompetent leadership prompted Argentines to 
call on the junta to resign and allow elections.  
 
8 Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 54. 
9 Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 54. 
10 “Argentina: A Troubled Transition [Sanitized],” June 3, 1983, Argentina Declassification Project (Washington, 
D.C.: The Department of State). 
11 Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 54. 
12 Mario Rapaport, Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (1880-2003) (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 2012), 
616.   
13 Jimmy Burns, “Argentine Junta Battered by Protests in Hot Political Summer,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
December 17, 1982. 
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Defeat in the Malvinas in addition to years of economic mismanagement discredited the 
military government and provided the necessary conditions for democratization. Responding to 
public pressure to step down, the armed forces had promised a gradual reopening of political 
activities in 1983. The military hoped to negotiate favorable terms of the transition and proposed 
several conditions. Among these proposals was the “non-revisability” of the Dirty War.14 This 
provision would prevent future investigations into the methods employed during the military’s 
fight against subversion. The political parties rejected these conditions and refused to openly 
bargain with a failing regime. 
Arguments, Definition, and Literature 
 The armed forces collapsed under the weight of its own mistakes. The military’s quick 
downfall forced it to negotiate the transition from a vulnerable position. The impact of failed 
economic, military, and social policies reduced the generals’ ability to secure a favorable 
agreement with incoming civilian leaders. The regime’s weakness meant that it could not place 
limits on the process. The People’s March for Democracy and National Reconstruction had 
already shown that civilian politicians could harness popular support against the military. The 
power of the people would allow political parties to exercise greater control in defining the terms 
of the democratic transition.15  
Raúl Alfonsín, presidential candidate for the Radical Civic Union Party, exploited the 
military’s weakened position. His campaign denounced the crimes of the outgoing regime and 
promised to prosecute the former leaders. However, restoration of the democratic system was his 
 
14 Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 61. 
15 Bonnie N. Field, “Transition Modes and Post-Transition Inter-Party Politics: Evidence from Spain (1977-82) and 
Argentina (1983-89),” Democratization 13, no. 2 (2006): 208. 
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first priority. If elected, Alfonsín pledged to uphold the nation’s 130-year-old Constitution and 
respect the authority of the legislative and judicial branches. His antimilitary platform paired 
with his commitment to constitutional processes won him the presidency on October 30, 1983.       
President Raúl Alfonsín’s administration would guide the return to democracy and set 
important precedents in the developing field of transitional justice. The term transitional justice 
refers to judicial and non-judicial measures taken to address human rights violations during the 
period following a repressive government. These transitional justice strategies include but are not 
limited to criminal judgement, truth commissions, and amnesty laws. Studies of transitional 
justice generally focus on the methods employed during shifts from an authoritarian to a 
democratic system.16 In such periods, the newly formed government has the mandate to balance 
order while promoting significant political reforms. 
Transitional justice measures face inherent challenges because governments undertake 
them during times of institutional change. In 1983, the fragile state of democracy throughout 
Latin America further complicated the situation facing President Alfonsín in Argentina. 
Neighboring countries including Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay still lived under military 
dictatorships in 1983. The region’s authoritarian outlook provided few allies for a democratic 
leader. This situation stoked fears in the Alfonsín administration that the Argentine armed forces 
might look to neighboring authoritarian regimes for support.17 
The proliferation of military regimes throughout Latin America presented a challenge to 
Alfonsín’s government, but he hoped Argentina would serve as a democratic model for the 
 
16 Colleen Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 1.  
17 Dominique Fournier, “The Alfonsin Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the Southern 
Cone and the Andes,” Journal of Latin American Studies 31, no. 1 (1999): 41. 
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region. “We will be an example that rebirth is possible for our compatriots, our Latin American 
brothers and sisters, and the international community,” proclaimed Alfonsín. “We will seek 
liberty and democracy for Argentines . . . and we will fight for liberty and democracy in the 
world.”18 If President Alfonsín succeeded in establishing a healthy democracy while also 
employing transitional justice strategies, he imagined other countries would follow his example.  
This thesis traces the evolution of Alfonsín’s human rights policies from his candidacy to 
his presidency. Focused on the period from 1983 to 1987, it outlines the influence of political 
and military actors on the president’s agenda. The research engages with literature on transitional 
justice to highlight how human rights prosecutions both promote and complicate efforts to 
democratize. Successful trials, which respect legal codes and due process, demonstrate the law’s 
ability to address wrongdoing. Such efforts help reestablish trust in judicial processes. This is 
important in societies where violations of the law became the norm due to state-sanctioned 
human rights abuses.19 However, the military’s resistance to prosecution poses a threat to the 
survival of emerging and re-emerging democracies.  
Alfonsín recognized that the country could not move forward without punishing the 
perpetrators of gross violations. He also knew that a miscalculation could jeopardize democracy, 
which he saw as the most important prerequisite for social progress. “Democracy feeds, 
educates, and cures,” Alfonsín declared in his inaugural address.20 He offered democracy as a 
solution to Argentina’s many problems, and he promised to ensure its permanence. Such faith in 
 
18 Raúl Alfonsín, “Mensaje Presidencial del Dr. Raúl Alfonsín a la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa, 10 de 
diciembre de 1983,” in Mensajes Presidenciales del Dr. Raúl Alfonsín a la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa, 
Período 1983-1987, 67 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nación, 1987). 
19 Murphy, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice, 9. 
20 Alfonsín, “Mensaje Presidencial del Dr. Raúl Alfonsín a la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa, 10 de diciembre de 
1983,” in Mensajes Presidenciales del Dr. Raúl Alfonsín a la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa, Período 1983-1987, 
14. 
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the democratic system meant the president would seek compromise in his human rights policies 
in order to ensure the government’s stability. 
Although Alfonsín prioritized preserving democracy over pursuing extensive 
prosecutions, this decision did not intend to betray his commitment to human rights. He 
understood that massive abuses generally occur outside of a democratic system. Therefore, the 
president feared he might risk future human rights violations if widespread trials threatened to 
overthrow his government. Considering these challenges, Alfonsín aimed to prosecute the worst 
abuses and strengthen democracy by acting in accordance with the division of powers enshrined 
in the 1853 Constitution.   
Argentina’s return to democracy occurred at the beginning of a wave of similar shifts 
from military to civilian rule throughout Latin America. As a result, the Argentine experience 
heavily influenced the transitional justice scholarship that emerged in the 1990s. Numerous 
initial studies emphasized the difficulties of retroactively punishing those who had committed 
human rights abuses.21  
Early historiography on Argentina maintained that Alfonsín’s human rights policy had 
failed. For example, Bruce Ackerman (1992) concluded that trials for past violations of human 
rights risked undermining the authority of incoming governments. He maintained that Alfonsín 
had wasted his moral capital on ineffective and disorganized trials, which achieved few 
convictions.22 Similarly, Samuel Huntington (1993) contended that such prosecutions of former 
abusive dictators should generally be avoided, for the political costs outweigh any moral gains 
 
21 Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New York: Pantheon Books). See 
also Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), and Samuel 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993).  
22 Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, 72. 
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for the incoming government.23 Both analyses suggest that Alfonsín lacked the organizational 
capacity to undertake human rights prosecutions. Consequently, the president’s policy was 
susceptible to outside pressure, particularly that of the military. Laura Tedesco (1996) also 
suggested that Alfonsín reacted rather than led.24 Her argument implies that Alfonsín waited to 
act until events reached a crisis point instead of taking preemptive measures to avoid the 
situation. Similar conclusions about the inherent difficulties of punishing the perpetrators of 
human rights violations during periods of transition from authoritarian to democratic 
governments would dominate scholarship throughout the 1990s. Retributive policies against the 
military risked appearing vengeful and provoking backlash from the armed forces.     
As the field developed, literature centered on tensions between legal norms and political 
realities. Incoming Latin American governments faced issues of chronic instability, widespread 
abuses, and compromised judiciaries. These factors often led politicians to pursue few, if any, 
prosecutions for past violations. Scholars debated whether political conditions could justify 
limited judicial responses. In the case of Argentina, military coups had followed one another 
throughout more than half a century. This trend marked increasingly shorter periods of 
institutional normality and progressively longer dictatorships.25 Because of this history of 
instability, some Argentines feared that the armed forces would stage another coup if Alfonsín 
pursued extensive human rights prosecutions.   
 
23 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 224. 
24 Laura Tedesco, “The Argentine Armed Forces Under President Alfonsín,” European Review of Latin American 
and Caribbean Studies, no. 61 (December 1996): 34, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25675711; See also, Martha 
Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 44.  
25 Fernando Sabsay, Frondizi, Illia, Alfonsín: Estudio preliminar de Federico Storani (Buenos Aires: Ciudad 
Argentina, 2000), 371. 
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During the early 2000s, many characterized transitional justice as a compromise that 
sought to balance accountability and stability. Ruti Teitel (2000) acknowledged that legal 
responses in such periods are partial and contextual. Because the incoming government must 
pursue punishment in a phase of political change, penalties carry risky consequences for long-
term stability.26 Thomas C. Wright (2007) echoed this argument and claimed that successor 
regimes are rarely capable of seeking more than limited criminal sanctions.27 
Scholarship generally contended that the contradictions between punishment of past 
wrongdoings and future stability in the Argentine transition were too great to overcome. Thus, 
Alfonsín resorted to granting amnesties or, as Kathryn Sikkink (2011) describes, a balanced 
approach to trials. Consequently, the president of Argentina proposed a complicated set of 
policies designed to restrict prosecutions to a relatively small group. However, Sikkink believes 
the real-world application of these ideas escaped his control. When President Alfonsín faced 
pressure from political and military actors, he enforced limits on the scope of trials and issued 
pardons. 28 Teitel (2014) claims this partial exercise of punishment and justice is characteristic of 
transitions from dictatorships to democratic regimes. These governmental shifts seek to balance 
the judicial process with the need to establish institutional normality.29  
Colleen Murphy’s study, The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice (2017), 
departs from literature that understands transitional justice as a process of compromise. She 
 
26 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 30. 
27 Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights (United 
Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 33. 
28 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 70; See also, Horacio Verbitsky, “Entre olvido y memoria,” in Los juicios 
por crímenes de lesa humanidad en Argentina, ed. Gabriele Andreozzi (Buenos Aires: Atuel, 2011), 35. 
29 Ruti Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Comparative Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
99.  
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regards it as “a distinctive form” that differs from retributive, corrective, or distributive justice.30 
She maintains that scholars cannot reduce a theory of transitional justice to other types, which 
tend to focus on the acts of individuals rather than society as a whole. Murphy claims that the 
fundamental problem of transitional justice, unlike other forms, does not center around giving 
perpetrators what they deserve. Instead, the key issue is to pursue and achieve societal change in 
a fair manner. 31 
Murphy’s theory of transitional justice does not engage specific case studies. However, it 
can serve as a model both to evaluate the effectiveness of Alfonsín’s human rights policy and to 
address the unique circumstances of his government. As president, Alfonsín sought to reestablish 
a lasting democracy and address the wrongdoings of the predecessor regime. These goals would 
come into conflict during his administration because the military resisted human rights trials. 
Before Alfonsín’s presidency, no democratically elected president in Argentina had completed 
his or her term against the wishes of the armed forces. Yet, Alfonsín withstood military 
insurrection and still held trials for past violations. Applying Murphy’s theory to the Argentine 
case, President Alfonsín’s human rights policy proved a successful transitional justice model 
despite the limited scope of prosecutions.  
Based on domestic criminal law, Alfonsín’s human rights strategy respected due process 
and legal precedents. The use of preexisting legal codes prevented accusations that the new 
government sought to enforce laws that were not in effect at the time of alleged criminal 
wrongdoing. This approach marked a clear break with the past and sought to model democratic 
 
30 Retributive justice holds that those guilty of a crime deserve to endure a proportionate punishment. Corrective 
justice links the victim and injurer and maintains that the wrongdoer has a duty to repair the wrong or injury he or 
she caused. Distributive justice refers to the just allocation of resources in a society. Murphy, The Conceptual 
Foundations of Transitional Justice, 6. 
31 Ibid, 33-34 
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governance. Alfonsín thought that “democracy is strengthened by walking.”32 Thus, he believed 
that if his government respected democratic processes and constitutional norms, the country 
would reinvigorate these methods and achieve democratic stability.  
Throughout Argentina’s history, executives ruled via exaggerated presidential powers. 
The authority of the legislative and judicial branches to place constraints on the president 
remained largely an unfulfilled promise. Over time, this presidential system eroded democratic 
norms.33 Thus, Alfonsín’s promise to adhere to the Constitution and respect the separation of 
powers marked a clear departure from historical practices. These strong constitutional principles 
ultimately hindered the success of his human rights program and led to dangerous clashes with 
the armed forces. Historically, almost no governments—elected or not—had adhered to the 
system of checks and balances enshrined in the 1853 Constitution.   
Studies have traditionally evaluated Alfonsín’s success in navigating the Argentine 
transition in terms of his efforts to balance prosecution and stability. However, Murphy’s model 
offers an analytical framework that prioritizes the transformational nature of such periods. 
Applying this theory to the Argentine case, the metric would be for scholars to judge Alfonsín’s 
presidency based on whether it achieved social change and whether he pursued this 
transformation through just measures.  
Argentina pioneered new methods of addressing state sponsored human rights violations 
during Alfonsín’s administration. In the 1980s, many feared that human rights trials risked the 
long-term survival of democracy. Argentina disproved this theory by maintaining the most 
 
32 Raúl Alfonsín, La cuestión argentina (Buenos Aires: Torres Agüero Editor, 1984), 16. 
33 Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial Politics in Argentina (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 3. 
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domestic human rights trials during a period of transition from authoritarian to democratic 
government of any country while also enjoying its longest uninterrupted period of democracy.34 
Moreover, Never Again, the first published truth commission report became an international 
model. More than thirty countries have followed Argentina’s example since 1983, and Argentine 
personnel have worked as advisers to several commissions.35 Notably, the Argentine truth 
commission served as a model for the 1993 Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, the first 
sponsored and staffed by the United Nations. The U.N.’s support of El Salvador’s commission 
was a clear recognition of the importance of this type of transitional justice mechanism by the 
international community.36 
 The mechanisms applied early in Alfonsín’s term revolutionized the field of transitional 
justice, but the later years of his presidency limited this progress. As president, Alfonsín 
dedicated himself to overcoming Argentina’s legacy of authoritarianism and emphasized 
democratization as the main goal of the country’s transition. Argentina had experienced six 
military coups between 1930 and 1976, and no elected president had completed his or her 
mandate since 1928.37 In light of these political realities, Alfonsín made prudent decisions to 
achieve his legislative goals without undermining democratic processes and institutions. This 
approach marked a clear break with the past and sought to model democratic governance. 
Alfonsín’s methods also demonstrated that democracy, even when producing complicated and 
uneven policy victories, had the power to address social problems.  
 
34 Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, “The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Journal of 
Peace Research 44, no. 4 (2007): 434.  
35 Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights, 229. 
36 Priscilla B. Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994): 599. 
37 Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 5.  
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Chapter Two: The Human Rights Agenda 
 On October 27, 1983, thousands of Argentines gathered for the Radical Civic Union 
Party’s final campaign event in Buenos Aires.38 Raúl Alfonsín, the Radical Party’s presidential 
nominee, had spent the last three months traveling the country and outlining a platform 
committed to social justice. In just three days, the electoral campaign would end, and Argentines 
would head to the polls for the first time in a decade. This election promised the return of 
democracy after more than seven years of military rule.  
 The armed forces had overthrown President Isabel Perón and established a military 
government on March 24, 1976. Upon assuming power, the junta immediately restricted civil 
liberties, dissolved Congress, and dismissed Supreme Court justices. Military control ushered in 
a period of unprecedented violence. Task forces, dressed in civilian clothes, abducted suspected 
“subversives” and transferred them to clandestine detention centers throughout the country. In 
these detention centers, military officers subjected victims to interrogation, torture, and sexual 
abuse. The vast majority of victims died at the hands of their torturers.39 
 During the dictatorship, the military junta justified these tactics in the context of a war 
against subversives. The armed forces had seized control in a period of mass unemployment and 
high inflation, which had fostered the development of urban guerrilla movements. The junta 
promised to restore order through the eradication of subversion and the causes that favored its 
 
38 Figures vary considerably according to the source: 420,000 (La Época); 500,000 (La Voz); 600,000 (Tiempo 
Argentino, Ámbito Financiero); 800,000 (El Cronista Comercial, Buenos Aires Herald y la agencia DyN); 969,000 
(La Prensa); 1,500,000 (Radical Party Organization). The opposition party newspapers cite the lowest number of 
attendees. However, all sources note the impressive attendance. 
39 Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 54-55. 
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existence.40 Once in power, the armed forces would define dissidents in broad terms. “A terrorist 
is not just someone with a gun or bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to 
Western and Christian civilization,” claimed General Jorge Rafael Videla, the first president 
named by the dictatorship.41 This definition of subversion led to widespread repression, and the 
regime conducted an average of 30 kidnappings per day by September 1976.42 
The military junta’s violent tactics stifled dissent for many years, but the generals began 
to lose their grip on power after the Malvinas War. In April 1982, army leaders had initiated a 
war with Great Britain and suffered a humiliating loss only two months later. The Malvinas War 
highlighted the generals’ leadership failures and their inadequate coordination across branches.43 
Military defeat, following years of economic mismanagement and massive human rights 
violations, led to widespread unrest and calls for democratization. Leaders of various political 
parties formed a coalition known as the Multipartidaria and demanded the legalization of 
political parties and elections.44 Facing mounting problems and increased public pressure, the 
military promised a gradual political reopening over the course of 1983. 
At the outset of the 1983 campaign, domestic and international press had viewed Raúl 
Alfonsín’s odds of winning as unlikely at best. The rival Peronist Party had never lost a free and 
 
40 María Laura San Martino de Dromi, Argentina contemporánea de Perón a Menem (Buenos Aires: Fundación 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Administrativos, 1996), 765. 
41 Secretaria de Derechos Humanos de Argentina, Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Nunca 
más: informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2009), 345. 
42 Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 28. 
43 Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the 
Americas, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 148. 
44 Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 61.  
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fair election, so most Argentines assumed its candidate, Ítalo Luder, enjoyed certain victory.45 
However, Alfonsín’s lower national profile would prove an advantage against the Peronist 
candidate. Luder had strong ties to the last constitutional government under President Isabel 
Perón, and the military coup of 1976 had severely discredited her administration. 
Campaigning on his image as an activist and reform-minded democrat, Alfonsín drew on 
widespread discontent against the dictatorship. He adopted strong antimilitary rhetoric, promised 
to restore constitutional norms, and pledged to prosecute those responsible for human rights 
abuses. In his final appeal to voters, Alfonsín declared, “The military dictatorship is over. . . . 
Fear and repression are over. . . . Now it is we, the people, who are going to say how the country 
will be built.”46 The ballot offered Argentines a chance to decide their president at a time when 
the winner would guide the reconstruction of democratic institutions and practices. 
Tracing the 1983 presidential election, this chapter explores how Alfonsín’s campaign 
rhetoric garnered overwhelming support but subsequently hindered his ability to undertake key 
aspects of his human rights platform. Alfonsín had promised strict adherence to the constitution 
while simultaneously vowing to carry out comprehensive reforms. These goals would come into 
conflict throughout his presidency because the human rights trials that he proposed were 
unprecedented in Argentina. Thus, his commitment to constitutional norms and rejection of 
Argentina’s hyper-presidential system limited his power to navigate trials of this scale 
effectively.  
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Closing his final speech as a presidential candidate, Alfonsín asked the crowd to join him 
in a “secular prayer.” He then led them in reciting the Constitution’s preamble. In performing 
this act, Alfonsín called on Argentines to fight to “constitute national union, ensure justice, 
preserve domestic peace, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves, our posterity, and all men in the world who wish to 
dwell on Argentine soil.”47 He vowed that if elected, these principles would guide his 
administration. 
Alfonsín’s pledge to reinvigorate the Constitution paired with antimilitary rhetoric would 
win him the presidency. However, he felt “what prevailed was not joy but a sense of 
responsibility.”48 Once elected, Alfonsín was a prisoner of his own rhetoric. His oratory skills 
had delivered a swift and decisive electoral victory but bound him to deliver both democratic 
stability and successful prosecutions.  
As a candidate, Alfonsín had established his legitimacy by highlighting his activism and 
principled stance throughout the military dictatorship. His background as a human rights activist 
combined with his promise to uphold the constitution won him a stunning electoral victory. 
However, as a president, he could not afford to be dogmatic. Leadership during the transition to 
democracy would require compromise, but Alfonsín’s focus on strict adherence to the 
constitution would prove a liability during his presidency. Rather than draw on his electoral 
mandate and expansive presidential powers to enact his platform, Alfonsín frequently sought 
compromise when his plans met resistance. This strategy modeled democratic practices. 
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However, his conciliatory approach to leadership hindered his ability to take decisive action on 
contentious issues, and Alfonsín risked losing significant political capital if he did not maintain 
his commitment to human rights. 
The Call for Elections     
Defeat in the Falklands War had signaled the beginning of the dictatorship’s end. Lasting 
only eight weeks, the war had further demonstrated the regime’s inability to govern and 
intensified calls for an end to the military government. General Leopoldo Galtieri renounced the 
presidency under pressure from the armed forces, and General Reynaldo Bignone assumed 
leadership on July 1, 1982. Tasked with negotiating the regime’s exit from power, Bignone 
assured a gradual return to democracy, scheduled voting for October 30, 1983, and set the 
transfer of power for January 30, 1984.49 
With the promise of elections secured, the two major political parties, the Radical Civic 
Union and the Peronist Party, organized themselves and appointed candidates. The Radicals 
showed fewer signs of internal division and selected a nominee with little infighting. Alfonsín 
earned sweeping victories against his opponent, Fernando de la Rúa, in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, 
Santa Fe, and Tucumán.50 De la Rúa, who represented a more conservative line of the Radical 
Civic Union, withdrew his candidacy in hopes that the Party would “gain valuable time” in the 
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national electoral campaign. Following his opponent’s exit, Alfonsín officially accepted his 
party’s candidacy on July 28, 1983.51 
Alfonsín had centered his campaign for the Radical Party’s nomination around his 
background as a human rights advocate. During the dictatorship, he had represented relatives of 
the disappeared and helped establish the Permanent Assembly on Human Rights. Founded in 
1975, the organization played an important role in defending civil and political rights.52 
Alfonsín’s history of activism strongly influenced his policy proposals and granted him greater 
legitimacy on human rights issues.  
In contrast to the Radical Civic Union, the Peronist Party appeared less united. Its 
primary included five presidential candidates. As a result of the larger field within the Peronist 
Party, internal elections took longer to nominate a presidential candidate. The Peronist’s two 
frontrunners, Ítalo Luder and Antonio Cafiero, did not become clear until late June, and neither 
candidate secured a clear lead until late July.53 Following internal negotiations, Luder, who had 
served as president of the senate from 1974 to 1976, eventually secured the Peronist nomination 
on August 23, 1983.54   
Human Rights in Focus 
The divisions within the Peronist Party had made its frontrunner unclear and had given 
Alfonsín an advantage during the runup to the presidential campaign. As the first major 
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candidate to secure his party’s leadership and subsequent nomination, Alfonsín set the terms of 
public debate. His campaign promised to reestablish the rule of law in Argentina and appealed 
directly to the rights and guarantees granted by the 1853 Constitution. He frequently closed his 
speeches by reading the preamble to the Constitution and claimed that it contained “everything 
necessary to begin” democratization.55  
Throughout the campaign, Alfonsín referenced the Constitution as a starting point and 
guiding document for the next period of civilian rule. He continually stressed that restoring 
democracy was a process, and it would not occur through elections alone. “The vote is not a 
magic wand that touches us and places us in a state of democratic grace,” he reminded 
Argentines.56 Instead, Alfonsín insisted that democracy would require much more than voting. 
He held that the success of democratization depended on the incoming civilian government’s 
willingness to exercise power according to constitutional standards. 
By governing within legal constraints and respecting the separation of powers, Alfonsín 
maintained that the country’s institutions would improve. He claimed that Argentina’s history of 
military intervention and authoritarianism had slowly eroded its democratic potential.57 Because 
of Argentina’s historically unstable democracy, he believed the incoming government should not 
expect efficient political institutions but rather work to strengthen them.58 Thus, Alfonsín’s 
appeals to the Constitution sought to reassure voters that he would honor democratic norms and 
reinvigorate political institutions if elected president. 
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Although Alfonsín primarily referenced the Constitution to evoke democratic values, he 
also used the document to further his human rights platform. He emphasized that Article 18 of 
the Constitution guaranteed the right to due process and outlawed torture and capital 
punishment.59 In highlighting Article 18, Alfonsín signaled his condemnation of the military 
junta and its repressive practices. Furthermore, he based his judgement on Argentine law, which 
preceded the dictatorship, rather than on morality alone.   
Because Alfonsín increasingly centered public debate around human rights violations, he 
became seen as an “antimilitary” candidate. This reputation stemmed from his rhetoric in 
addition to his history of activism. Alfonsín had denounced the armed forces’ tactics in the 
suppression of terrorism and had defended numerous political detainees during the dictatorship.60 
At the time, few lawyers were willing to take on such cases for fear of retribution. This past 
advocacy strengthened his human rights credentials during his candidacy and stoked fears over 
trials and imprisonment within sectors of the armed forces.  
The discussion of sanctions against the military prompted the outgoing regime to attempt 
to protect itself. In April 1983, the armed forces published the “Final Document on the Struggle 
Against Subversion and Terrorism.” The text justified the junta’s actions in the context of a civil 
war and denied the practice of forced disappearances. In reference to what the leaders of the 
junta defined as errors in the exercise of power, the regime  maintained, “Only history will be 
able to determine with certainty to whom corresponds the direct responsibility of unjust methods 
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or innocent deaths.”61 The publication of this document attempted to silence future discussion of 
disappearances and protect the military from legal repercussions. 
In trying to close the question on the disappearances, the junta had magnified the issue in 
the electoral campaign. The “Final Document” received widespread condemnation and drew 
further attention to the human rights question. Responding to the publication, Alfonsín promised 
that if elected, “illicit acts committed during the repression would be judged by the courts and 
not only history.”62 Thus, human rights trials became a central tenet of his platform, but he tried 
to present a measured tone. Alfonsín assured he did not seek revenge and explained he would not 
prosecute those “who were merely obeying orders in a time of extreme confusion.”63 This 
proposal suggested a limited number of trials against top-ranking military officers.  
Hoping to frame himself as the only candidate with plans to address human rights 
violations, Alfonsín repeatedly argued that the Peronists would not hold the military accountable. 
He claimed the Peronist Party and members of the armed forces had held secret negotiations, 
which exchanged campaign support for a promise to end investigations into the disappeared 
persons.64 Denying this allegation, the Peronists said that such an agreement was “like signing a 
pact with a corpse,” and they accused their competitor of trying to win votes from “the strongly 
anti-military Peronist Labor base.” 65  
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Alfonsín’s claim lacked substantial evidence, but many found the accusation of a Peronist 
pact with the military credible. Press coverage played a role in legitimizing such rumors. In 
March, newspapers had reported meetings between President Bignone and Peronist leaders “to 
share ideas about the transition.”66 Additionally, intelligence documents from the United States 
C.I.A. indicate that they believed the military leaders had given “political and financial backing 
to Peronist candidates.”67  
Luder’s past political record also damaged his party’s credibility and fueled rumors of 
military sympathies. From September to October 1975, he acted as interim president of 
Argentina while President Isabel Perón recovered from an illness. Isabel Perón had assumed the 
presidency after the death of her husband, President Juan Perón, in July 1974. During Luder’s 
brief tenure, he signed a decree that granted the armed forces power to “annihilate subversion.” 68 
The order expanded the military’s influence, and the armed forces frequently cited this decree as 
evidence of civilian support for their violent tactics during the dictatorship.  
While Luder, Alfonsín’s competitor, tried to overcome his past association with political 
violence and rumors about a military pact, Alfonsín capitalized on the country’s renewed interest 
in the human rights issue. He offered the public a more detailed plan for trials and investigations 
than his opponent had provided. Alfonsín maintained that he would hold those responsible for 
human rights violations accountable through investigations and trials. However, he established 
three levels of responsibility: those who gave orders, those who exceeded orders, and those who 
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followed orders. The final category, those who followed orders, would not face prosecution for 
their participation.69 Using these classifications, Alfonsín believed he could bring the principal 
architects of the repressive framework to justice without antagonizing the entire military. This 
limited approach to prosecution would allow the armed forces to integrate into democratic 
society.  
As the presidential candidates and the public debated the possibility of human rights 
prosecution, the military junta made a final attempt to guard itself against trials. President 
Bignone issued The Law of National Pacification on September 27, 1983. The decree granted a 
general amnesty for all criminal offenses committed by the armed forces between May 25, 1973 
and June 17, 1982.70 Additionally, the law ordered an immediate end to all ongoing 
investigations into deaths and disappearances if they involved members of the police or 
military.71  
Although the Law of National Pacification sought to close the ongoing debate about 
prosecution, its decree ignited public debate. President Bignone claimed the measure would help 
the country overcome past tragedies and consolidate peace.72 However, political leaders as well 
as leading legal and religious figures criticized the amnesty measure as self-serving and 
unconstitutional.73  
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The Law of National Pacification provided Alfonsín yet another opportunity to highlight 
the strength of his social justice platform in comparison to his competitor. While both 
presidential candidates condemned the law, Alfonsín took the stronger stance and promised to 
seek its annulment. He pledged, “We will not build the country’s future . . . on the basis of a 
moral abdication that would certainly exist if we acted as if nothing had happened in 
Argentina.”74 In contrast, the Peronist candidate Luder claimed the effects of the law could not 
be repealed.75 This weak response further demonstrated the willingness of the Peronists to 
appease the armed forces and bolstered Alfonsín’s credentials as the human rights candidate.  
Alfonsín Wins the Presidency 
Argentines returned to the polls for the first time in over a decade on October 30, 1983. 
In a landslide victory, Alfonsín won fifty-two percent of the vote while Luder received forty 
percent. The loss shocked the Peronists, who had never lost a presidential election. Many blamed 
the defeat on the violent rhetoric of some sectors of the party.76 The Peronist Youth had adopted 
the chant: “We will return, the soldiers of Perón will return, the milicos are afraid, they are afraid 
of the wall.”77 For some voters, the song’s vengeful tone meant that a Peronist victory would 
lead to more political violence.  
The Peronist Party’s last campaign rally had confirmed those fears. The party’s 
presidential candidate, Ítalo Luder, and its candidate for Governor of Buenos Aires, Herminio 
Iglesias, delivered their final speeches to an enormous crowd gathered in the city’s center. 
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Closing the event, Iglesias lit fire to a wooden coffin inscribed: “UCR. Alfonsín. Rest in 
Peace.”78 National television broadcast the act across the country. For many, the symbolic 
burning of the opposition signified a continuation of violence rather than a new democratic 
beginning.  
In contrast to the Peronist Party, the Radicals had campaigned on a message of tolerance, 
peace, and democracy. The Radical Party youth, known as the National Coordinating Junta, 
popularized the slogan: “We are life, we are peace, we are the National Coordinating Junta.”79 
Unlike the opposition, the Radical youth defined its party as separate from the violence and 
bloodshed of the preceding years. Their message contrasted with the vengeful tone of the 
Peronist youth and offered hope for reconciliation. However, the substantive difference between 
the parties’ candidates was Alfonsín’s willingness to condemn the military’s self-amnesty and to 
guarantee trials. After nearly eight years of violence, the country had sought a clear break from 
military rule. Alfonsín’s promise to adhere to the Constitution and reestablish democratic norms 
signaled such a rupture with the country’s history of military intervention.  
Addressing his supporters as news of his election broke, Alfonsín conveyed a message of 
future stability and unity. “We have won, but we have defeated no one,” he proclaimed. “This is 
a victory for Argentina.”80 This conciliatory gesture sought to make clear that his government 
would seek a path of national reunification. For a country on the verge of bankruptcy and 
traumatized by political violence, Alfonsín sent a message of hope. His election represented not 
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only the restoration of democracy but also the repudiation of the crimes committed by the 
outgoing regime. 
Alfonsín’s victory over the Peronist Party had shocked the nation, and the unexpected 
defeat suggested the beginning of a new era. Argentines had embraced the president-elect’s 
message of change, and they greeted his election with enthusiasm. Reacting to the Radical 
Party’s electoral triumph, Poet Jorge Luis Borges wrote, “Hope, which was nearly impossible a 
few days ago, is now our fortunate duty.”81 A sense of optimism and anticipation had returned as 
the country’s bloodiest dictatorship came to an end.  
In spite of this celebratory atmosphere, Alfonsín faced a challenging situation. He would 
inherit a devastated economy and a country prone to democratic instability. No democratically 
elected president had finished his or her term since 1928.82 Promising to overcome this legacy, 
Alfonsín assured Argentines that his inauguration would usher in “100 years of freedom, peace, 
and democracy.”83 However, this future would depend on his ability to restore democratic 
institutions and address human rights issues, which had dominated the presidential campaign.  
Beyond Campaign Promises 
Alfonsín assumed the presidency on December 10, 1983. In his first presidential address, 
he called upon Congress to act in the interest of the people, and he encouraged all Argentines to 
reflect on the errors of the past. “The sorrow that we have lived left us lessons that we cannot nor 
should we forget, lessons that will help us leave this intolerable situation once and for all,” he 
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reminded them. “Nations, like men, mature in suffering, and we would not be worthy of the 
name of the Argentine nation if we were not capable of learning the lesson of this pain.”84 In 
calling on the past and emphasizing the need to remember, Alfonsín indicated his continued 
commitment to meet the demands for memory, truth, and justice. 
Alfonsín would devote his first days in office to outlining the human rights policies that 
he had endorsed during the campaign. He hoped to capitalize on the outpouring of public support 
that had followed his election. Therefore, on December 13, few days after his inauguration, he 
sent a series of bills to Congress. The first proposal sought to repeal the military’s self-amnesty 
while the others aimed to modify the penal code. The reforms would ratify international treaties 
on human rights, raise the sentence for torture to life imprisonment, and place military courts 
under civilian review.85 
At the same time that Alfonsín proposed judicial reforms, he also ordered the detention of 
the nine military leaders of the first three military juntas that had governed Argentina between 
1976 and 1982.86 He called for an investigation in order to determine who had been guilty of 
human rights violations and announced that the members of juntas would face trial before a 
military tribunal.87 In the event that the Supreme Council refused to cooperate or excessively 
delayed trials, federal courts held broad powers of review.   
The president’s swift action against the armed forces immediately established hostile 
relations with the military. Within the army, there existed sectors that believed Alfonsín was an 
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extreme leftist, who sought to destroy the military institution.88 General Luciano Menéndez 
claimed, “This judicial stage is a continuation of the revolutionary war that our homeland 
endured. . . . What subversion didn’t achieve with weapons, it claims to obtain by taking refuge 
in the law in order to mock and violate [the law].”89 Those who shared this opinion took an 
aggressive stance against the government. “When we return to power, my hand will not tremble 
when I order Raúl Alfonsín’s execution,” threatened General Ramón Camps.90 Such statements 
from military sectors made it clear that the armed forces would not easily comply with trials.  
Hoping to alleviate tension with the army, Alfonsín emphasized his plans for limited 
trials. He assured the armed forces that he did not seek sweeping prosecutions. Instead, he aimed 
to restrict trials to the highest levels of the dictatorship’s repressive framework and to protect 
those who merely followed orders.91 The president believed such distinctions would avoid 
antagonizing the entire military.    
This proposal, later known as Due Obedience, derived from article 514 of the Argentine 
military code. Article 514 established that when a soldier commits a crime ordered by his 
superior, the only person responsible for the crime is the superior, unless the subordinate exceeds 
the scope of the order.92 Because Alfonsín had opted to respect military jurisdiction over trials of 
the armed forces, he believed the courts would honor the principle of Due Obedience. 
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Furthermore, Alfonsín thought military jurisdiction would allow the institution to cleanse itself, 
privately and with minimal civil interference.93    
In allowing the military to try its own, the president risked losing the support of his base. 
Human rights activists protested that civilian courts should run the trials. They felt that the 
president had conceded to the military by allowing it to judge its own members.94 However, 
Alfonsín wanted to respect the legal code in place at the time of alleged wrongdoing. This meant 
honoring military jurisdiction. Although many worried this system would allow the armed forces 
to avoid prosecutions, Alfonsín had designed a two-stage process. This compromise, which 
established federal oversight, would transfer pending cases to civilian courts if the Supreme 
Council refused to cooperate.  
Finally, two days after order the detention of the three military juntas, on December 15, 
1983, Alfonsín formed the National Commission on the Disappearance of People (CONADEP). 
The commission’s purpose was to investigate the circumstances surrounding the disappearance 
of individuals between 1976 and 1983 and to inform the Executive and Legislative branches of 
these findings. The president defined the fact-finding mission as a “complement and not a 
substitute for judicial work.”95 At the end of 180 days, CONADEP would publish a final report 
documenting its investigation.  
Alfonsín had outlined his plan for the commission during an interview with El País prior 
to his inauguration. He proposed a commission of notables, which included public figures from 
fields as varied as journalism, law, literature, science, and religion. The majority had also been 
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defenders of human rights during the dictatorship.96 Explaining the necessity for an investigative 
committee, he said, “We want the truth to be known about what happened.”97  
While human rights organizations supported the idea of a truth commission, they 
disagreed with the president’s model. Activists maintained that only a bicameral commission 
would have the necessary legal power to subpoena the military and politically condemn state 
terror.98 Alfonsín, however, wanted to avoid politicizing the process. He feared that legislators in 
a bicameral commission would not act impartially due to political pressure, and he thought that 
the authority to condemn past violations belonged exclusively to the judicial branch.99  
Despite this climate of opposition, the truth commission proceeded as envisioned by 
Alfonsín and included ten notable public figures appointed by the president.100 Members of 
CONADEP unanimously elected novelist Ernesto Sábato as president, and he would go on to be 
the principal author of the commission’s report.101 In addition to prominent civilians, Alfonsín 
also invited congressmen from the majority parties to nominate representatives. However, only 
three members of Congress, who were also members of his own party, would participate in the 
commission.102  
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The opposition’s refusal to designate representatives signaled the political divide 
regarding human rights issues. Although the Peronists had campaigned on a platform that 
honored the military’s self-amnesty, they changed their stance after Alfonsín’s surprise victory. 
Carlos Nino, Deputy Assistant to the President, claimed the opposition feared the Radical Party 
would become unbeatable if its human rights policy succeeded.103 Thus, the Peronists sought to 
undermine the president’s position. 
Although CONADEP had limited political support, it successfully completed its mandate 
and uncovered significant evidence. The commission received more than 50,000 declarations 
over the course of 1984. In a public ceremony on September 20, 1984, CONADEP delivered its 
report, Never Again, to the president. The investigation registered 8,961 cases of disappearance 
and identified 340 clandestine detention centers, but the report recognized that these figures were 
likely lower than the real number of desaparecidos. Sábato, President of CONADEP, clarified 
that Never Again was “inevitably an open list.”104  
Although the list compiled by the commission was incomplete, the report aimed to offer a 
general representation of the types of crimes committed between 1976 and 1983. In the prologue, 
Sábato acknowledged that the president had not established the commission to judge and urged 
Argentines to “expect from justice the definitive word.” 105 However, he maintained that the 
commission could not “be silent about what we have heard, read and recorded.”106 Never Again 
offered the first official recognition of the crimes committed by the military dictatorship. It 
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would also serve the judicial system as a significant source of evidence during human rights 
trials. 
 While the thoroughness and impartiality of CONADEP marked a significant victory for 
Alfonsín’s human rights policy, the trials under military jurisdiction had stalled. The Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces had placed General Videla and Officer Massera in preventative 
detention in August 1984. Their detention signaled progress in the judicial investigations. 
However, in the following month, the tribunal admitted it could not complete trials within the 
period allotted by the Executive.  
Although the Supreme Council initially blamed time constraints, its subsequent 
statements indicated that the tribunal simply refused to judge the military. The Supreme Council 
had claimed, “As a result of the studies performed to date, the decrees, directives, and 
operational orders that mandated the military activity against subversion are, with regard to their 
content and form, unobjectionable.”107 Responding to the failure of the Supreme Council, the 
Federal Court of Appeals immediately ordered the military tribunal to send the fifteen thousand 
pages of files to Federal Prosecutor Julio Strassera. Civil courts would now retain jurisdiction 
over the trial of the military juntas. 
Conclusion 
 Alfonsín strived to deliver on his promise to address past human rights violations in his 
first acts as president. Drawing on popular support following the election, he relied on a 
combination of judicial and non-judicial measures to deal with past wrongs. Alfonsín allowed 
military courts to retain jurisdiction over trials but also designed a truth commission led by 
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notable civilians to investigate human rights abuses. This relatively cautious approach sought to 
balance the call for accountability with the need to integrate the armed forces into democratic 
society. 
 Despite Alfonsín’s attempts at moderation, his actions drew criticism from both 
supporters and detractors. Those who had backed his human rights platform expected a harsher 
stance toward the military. By campaigning on his reputation as an activist, Alfonsín had created 
high expectations for justice and accountability. He now risked losing political capital with his 
base, who viewed any compromise as a concession to the military. In contrast, the armed forces 
believed the president sought to destroy the institution. Alfonsín’s antimilitary rhetoric 
throughout the campaign hindered his prospects of establishing positive civil-military relations 
during his administration. 
 These early conflicts surrounding the implementation of his human rights agenda would 
only intensify as the trials proceeded through civilian courts. Unlike the truth commission, the 
president had limited control over prosecutions. The judiciary, whose authority he could not 
challenge without sacrificing his democratic reputation, now held greater power over the scope 
of trials. This process complicated Alfonsín’s agenda and increased tension with the military, 
who expected the president to exercise greater authority over the extent and duration of 
prosecutions.    
 34 
Chapter Three: The Trial of the Juntas 
 On March 28, 1985, a bomb exploded at the Radical Civic Union Party Headquarters in 
the urban suburb of San Martín, northwest of Greater Buenos Aires. The attack was the third in 
as many days.108 No group claimed credit for the series of bombings throughout the provinces, 
but many suspected that the upcoming trial of the military juntas motivated the incidents. The 
Federal Court of Appeals had retained jurisdiction over the legal proceedings, and the trial was 
set to begin on April 22. As attacks on political offices and headquarters continued, rumors of a 
possible coup gained traction.109 
 President Alfonsín addressed the nation on the eve of the trial of the military generals and 
condemned the violent episodes that had recently occurred. “The voices of antidemocracy have 
suspiciously appeared in an effort to get the people . . . to lose their hopes, and to abandon their 
full and responsible exercise of freedom,” he claimed.110 To overcome these antidemocratic 
forces, he urged all Argentines to converge on Plaza de Mayo on the following Friday as a show 
of unity. Approximately 250,000 people responded to the president’s call and gathered to 
demonstrate their support for democracy.111 
 Over the course of the following eight months, the trial of the juntas captured national 
attention. The procedures were oral and open to the public. Although not televised or aired by 
radio, the trial received detailed coverage in El Diario del Juicio, a weekly publication that 
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documented the proceedings and included witness transcripts. The accessibility and publication 
of the facts surrounding the prosecution helped convert the trial into a national event, which not 
only punished the guilty but also helped create a shared understanding of the past.  
 The completion of the trial of the former military rulers provided President Alfonsín with 
a major policy victory. He had campaigned on the promise to hold the armed forces accountable 
for human rights violations, and he had delivered not only trials but also guilty verdicts. More 
importantly, he had done so through democratic and constitutional means. The legal proceedings 
relied on the Argentine criminal code in place at the time of alleged wrongdoing, and the judges 
delivered verdicts without interference from the executive. Such measures demonstrated the 
ability of democratic processes to condemn illegal acts, even when performed by those in power. 
This was an important act in a country prone to military intervention. 
 Although the trial of the juntas delivered on the president’s most important campaign 
promise, the sentencing undermined other aspects of his human rights agenda. Alfonsín had 
imagined a limited number of trials against the highest officers for the worst abuses. To achieve 
this reduced volume of prosecutions, the president hoped that the court would absolve lower 
ranking officers of criminal responsibility based on the principle of due obedience in the military 
code of justice. However, the justices had placed no limits on judicial activities. Instead, the final 
verdict ordered the continued investigation of subordinates, who may also hold blame for 
abhorrent crimes.112 
 Alfonsín expected the trial and conviction of members of the three military juntas to 
satisfy calls for justice. Ultimately, the prosecution exceeded the president’s expectations and 
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provoked more demand for trials. This occurred, in part, due to the growing autonomy of the 
judiciary under Alfonsín. Historically, the judicial branch was subordinate to the executive and 
could not act as a genuine check on presidential powers, but the courts showed a renewed 
willingness to challenge the executive during Alfonsín’s administration.113 The success of the 
trial of the military generals also restored the legitimacy of the courts among ordinary citizens. 
Judicial means now seemed more viable because the judiciary had managed to convict even the 
most powerful military leaders.   
 Examining judicial appointments and procedures under the Alfonsín administration, this 
chapter considers how the judiciary’s growing autonomy both facilitated and impeded the 
president’s policies. The Federal Court of Appeals’ resistance to intimidation from the armed 
forces made possible the trial of the juntas and delivered a major political victory to the 
president. However, this same resistance to outside influence meant that the court would not 
make decisions based on the desires of the executive. Although Alfonsín publicly expressed hope 
that the courts would honor the principle of due obedience, the justices would act independently 
and advocate further investigations. 
 The consequences of this decision presented serious complications to the president’s 
human rights agenda. As the administration faced a second wave of trials, it feared that tensions 
with the military would reach new heights. The prospect of thousands of new charges against 
members of the armed forces exceeded Alfonsín’s plans and risked retaliation from the military. 
Thus, the same sentencing that provided his most important policy victory also jeopardized the 
civilian government’s tenuous control over the armed forces.  
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The Judiciary under Alfonsín  
 The trial of the juntas transferred to civilian courts after the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces refused to cooperate with the prosecution of the generals. The Supreme Council, 
composed of retired officers from each branch, was the military’s highest court. Its stance 
represented the first serious test of Alfonsín’s human rights program, and his administration 
received criticism from politicians and activists alike. Christian Democratic Party leader Néstor 
Vicente claimed, “It was wrong to believe that executioners would judge executioners.”114 For 
those who had opposed military jurisdiction over human rights trials, the Supreme Council’s 
failure to undertake investigations and prosecution demonstrated the armed forces’ commitment 
to impunity. 
 Prominent leaders in the human rights movement joined the public condemnation of the 
president and his faith in the military court system. “The Supreme Council is made up of 
murderers who have acted as was expected by the murderers whom they should have judged,” 
asserted Hebe Pastor de Bonafini, President of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo.115 She had 
endured significant personal losses during the military dictatorship. In February 1977, Bonafini’s 
oldest son disappeared. Her other son suffered the same fate in December 1977. The following 
year, her daughter-in-law disappeared. The abductions of her children led Bonafini to organize 
an advocacy group with mothers of the disappeared. Every Thursday, beginning in 1977, these 
women marched at Plaza de Mayo in front of the seat of the national government.116 The 
Mothers demanded answers about their children’s fate from the military dictatorship. With the 
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return of democracy, the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo challenged the civilian government to hold 
the armed forces accountable through trials. 
 Facing overwhelming public contempt, the Supreme Council called on the Ministry of 
Defense to protect the military court from public attacks. Minister of Defense Raúl Borrás, 
Alfonsín’s former campaign manager and most trusted cabinet member, offered little 
sympathy.117 “This court is exposed in a democratic society to the judgement of the people,” he 
explained.” It is always a valuable guide for people fulfilling public functions.”118 Borrás not 
only denied issuing a public statement in support of the Supreme Council, but his remarks 
implied that he too viewed the court’s behavior as undemocratic. Four days after the meeting 
with Borrás, all members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces resigned in protest.119  
 The military court’s refusal to issue verdicts had delayed legal proceedings and had 
communicated its contempt for trials against the armed forces. The subsequent resignation of all 
members of the Supreme Council further called into question the military’s subordination to 
civilian powers and the feasibility of prosecutions. The tribunal’s obstruction represented a 
significant defeat for Alfonsín, and his opposition claimed that he did not have control over his 
proposed human rights agenda.120  
 Although the Supreme Council had challenged the president’s authority, it did not derail 
his overall policy goals. Alfonsín had advocated for a two-stage process for the trial of the juntas 
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as president-elect. “My commitment is not with the military justice system exclusively, although 
I am currently obligated to continue in it,” he explained during a press interview, “So, I am now 
sending a law so that there is a possibility of appealing to ordinary courts over military 
courts.”121 The Code of Military Justice granted military jurisdiction to active duty service 
members who committed an infraction, whether in times of war or peace.122 Alfonsín felt bound 
to respect statutes in place at the time of alleged wrongdoing, but he had prepared alternative 
legal solutions in the event that the Supreme Council shirked its responsibility to prosecute. 
 Furthermore, Alfonsín had never imagined that he would exercise absolute control over 
judicial proceedings. Instead, he had emphasized the necessity of a “strong and independent” 
judiciary.123 As a testament to this commitment, Alfonsín appointed politically diverse 
candidates to the Supreme Court. He initially offered the post of Chief Justice to Ítalo Luder, the 
defeated Peronist presidential candidate. Luder did not accept the position, but the offer 
suggested that partisanship did not drive Alfonsín’s nominations. Ultimately, only two of the five 
appointments to the Supreme Court shared the president’s political affiliation.124  
 The appellate court judges appointed by Alfonsín also reflected diverse ideological and 
partisan backgrounds. The president selected Ricardo Gil Lavedra, Andrés D’Alessio, Carlos 
Arslanián, Jorge Valerga Araoz, Jorge Torlasco, and Guillermo Ledesma to the Federal Court of 
Appeals. These justices would gain significant influence over the president’s human rights 
program because they held powers of review over the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Of 
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these nominees, only two held Radical party sympathies, but the majority had demonstrated 
professional and moral courage during the military dictatorship. 125 For example, Torlasco and 
Ledesma had declared during the dictatorship that the military’s self-amnesty was 
unconstitutional.126 
 The president’s judicial nominees sought to communicate respect for the institution’s 
independence from the executive. As a vocal critic of the hyper-presidentialism that had 
dominated Argentina’s history, Alfonsín viewed the separation of powers as fundamental to the 
consolidation of democracy. This commitment to judicial independence required surrendering 
some level of control, but he thought this sacrifice was necessary to strengthen the country’s 
democratic institutions. As a result of the administration’s efforts to promote judicial autonomy, 
the justices and appellate court judges reported that Alfonsín never pressured them to support his 
preferences. Court rulings, which reflected a growing independence from the executive during 
his presidency, support these claims.127  
The Trial of the Juntas 
 With the judiciary reconstituted and the Supreme Council renouncing its duty to 
prosecute, the Federal Court of Appeals assumed jurisdiction over the trials of the military juntas 
in October 1984. General Jorge Rafael Videla, senior commander in the army and de facto 
president from March 24, 1976 to March 29, 1981, swiftly presented a request to return his case 
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to the Armed Forces Supreme Council, which he recognized as his “natural judge.”128 Former 
Air Force Commanders Orlando Agosti and Omar Graffigna presented similar appeals as a 
“political stand” against civilian trials of military officials.129  
 The court rejected all requests, and the Federal Court of Appeals turned the cases over to 
the prosecutor, Julio Strassera. Receiving more than 15,000 pages of files, Strassera’s first step 
was to recruit an assistant prosecutor. Luis Moreno Ocampo, a specialist in criminal law from the 
Solicitor General’s Office, was the only lawyer willing to accept the position.130 Moreno 
Ocampo came from a conservative, military family, and his relatives pressured him not to accept 
the post. In fact, his uncle, a retired army colonel, never spoke to him again after the trial of the 
juntas.131 Moreno Ocampo believed his background provided insight into the difficult task facing 
the prosecution. They would have to prove that the military had committed crimes and deserved 
punishment not only to the justices but also to sectors of Argentine society that had supported the 
military dictatorship.  
 While the prosecution began its work on the trial, Strassera requested a meeting with 
President Alfonsín. Argentina, and Latin America as a whole, had never held trials against 
former authoritarian leaders for crimes committed during their governments. Thus, the 
prosecution could not draw from historical precedence and expected Alfonsín to offer guidance. 
Instead, Strassera recalled that “the president, who could have given me instructions, told me 
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explicitly that as prosecutor I had complete freedom. Astonishing!”132 Alfonsín’s refusal to 
intervene, even at the request of the prosecution, sought to strengthen the separation of powers 
between the executive and the judiciary. 
 As the prosecution gathered evidence and prepared its argument, Strassera and Moreno 
Ocampo relied heavily on the truth commission report compiled by the National Commission on 
the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). The staff of CONADEP selected 1,500 cases where 
evidence helped establish the responsibility of the military leaders on trial.133 Strassera and 
Moreno Ocampo then narrowed this selection to 670 cases. Over the course of February and 
March 1985, the prosecution cited defendants and shared the identity of the victims in order to 
justify preventive detention of the ex-leaders of the military juntas.134  
The first public hearing of the trial of the members of the three juntas began in April 
1985. Strassera presented 709 charges against the former military leaders. The most frequent 
accusations were kidnapping, torture, and murder.135 The forced disappearance of persons did 
not figure into the charges because the crime did not officially exist in Argentine legislation and 
the crime of homicide required a cadaver.136 “The trial would be a purely accusatory procedure,” 
explained Strassera. “What I could not prove could not be grounds for conviction by the 
court.”137 This strategy limited charges against the ex-commanders. However, Strassera believed 
it necessary that the trials rely on irrefutable evidence to convict the accused rather than “the 
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intimate conviction that he is a torturer.”138 This method demonstrated strict compliance with the 
Constitution and domestic criminal law in order to avoid any implication that the prosecution had 
applied retroactive law.139  
 The clandestine nature of the juntas’ repressive practices restricted the charges, but the 
prosecution sought to establish a methodical pattern to the violence. Since releasing the “Final 
Document on the Struggle against Subversion and Terrorism” in April 1983, the armed forces 
had maintained that any unjust or innocent deaths were the result of errors or excesses committed 
by individual officers.140 Strassera’s case selection sought to disprove this defense by 
demonstrating that a sustained pattern of abduction, torture, and murder occurred countrywide. 
By proving similarities across numerous military commands, Strassera argued that the former 
leaders had established an apparatus of state terror and could not attribute the violence to a few 
renegade officers.141  
 Beyond detailing the facts of the 709 cases and establishing a pattern of repressive 
practices, the prosecution needed to prove a legal basis for punishment. The juntas’ commanders 
did not directly engage in or supervise the described atrocities, but they had issued the 
instructions calling for the annihilation of subversion.142 In the context of state-sanctioned 
violence, Strassera reasoned that the ex-leaders were indirect authors of the crimes committed 
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because they exercised complete control of the repressive apparatus and over the direct agent, or 
subordinate.143 
 The prosecution sought to demonstrate that the generals held responsibility for the actions 
of their subordinates due to the structure and culture of the armed forces. Within the military, the 
top brass could remove and replace someone for noncompliance. Thus, the individual was 
interchangeable, and the crime would likely occur with or without that person’s participation. 
Furthermore, the armed forces encouraged total confidence in one’s superiors. Retired Navy 
Officer Adolfo Scilingo, who would gain fame in the 1990s as the first man to break the 
military’s pact of silence, explained, “In the navy, there’s no such thing as orders that aren’t 
legal.”144 Scilingo’s account detailed a military institution that expected blind obedience and 
discouraged individual assessment of an order’s legitimacy.  
 The testimony of military officers during the trial helped the prosecution establish the 
unique context in which human rights violations occurred. First Lieutenant Ernesto Facundo 
Urien detailed how the hierarchal structure of the armed forces encouraged compliance because 
those who expressed differing opinions risked their career.145 After questioning tactics used in 
the war against subversion, Urien recounted his forced retirement for “not sharing the 
philosophies that the institution upheld.”146 Fear of repercussions for speaking out extended 
beyond professional concerns. “The climate that existed was don’t risk frank opinions,” testified 
Captain Félix Roberto Bussico, “There inside, life had no value . . . regardless of the life 
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involved.”147 An officer could refuse to comply with orders, but the repressive apparatus bred 
fear of retaliation and limited subordinates’ decision-making capacity. 
 Witness testimony would serve as the prosecution’s most powerful tool during the trial of 
the juntas. More than 800 people testified throughout the proceedings and shared dramatic details 
of torture and abuse.148 In response, the defense frequently resorted to attacks on the individual’s 
character. This strategy often backfired. After an aggressive line of questioning, Magdalena Ruiz 
Guiñazú, journalist and member of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, 
replied with her own question. “Is it lawful,” she asked, “to torture, kill, and make people 
disappear?”149 Guiñazú’s retort highlighted the criminality of the defendants’ actions regardless 
of the victims’ alleged political affiliations or actions.  
The Final Verdict 
 On September 11, 1985, Strassera gave his closing statements and summarized the 
prosecution’s evidence. He began by recognizing that the 709 cases did not encompass the scope 
of crimes committed during the military dictatorship. However, the charges established a pattern 
of state-sanctioned violence. Strassera accused the former dictators of using the same unethical 
tactics—kidnapping, torture, and murder—that they claimed to fight.150 
 Concluding his argument, Strassera emphasized the depravity of the crimes described 
during the trial. He claimed that the accused had committed offenses for which Dante, in the 
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Divine Comedy, had reserved for the seventh circle of hell.151 For these abhorrent crimes, 
Strassera asked for penalties ranging from life imprisonment for the members of the first two 
juntas to ten years for members of the last junta.152 He finished with a phrase that he declared 
now belonged to all of Argentina: “Your Honors: Never Again.”153 
 The defense attorneys began their summation on September 30, 1985. They responded to 
the charges along three lines of argument: the political nature of the process; the “warlike” state, 
under which the acts and measures of the military should be understood and justified; and the 
unconstitutionality of the trial, as it removed the former commanders from military 
jurisdiction.154 Furthermore, the accused believed the trial punished them for acts of service to 
the nation. “He who saves the nation does not break any law,” asserted the defense counsel for 
Lami Dozo, air force general and member of the third junta.155 The defendants understood their 
actions within the context of an ideological war, so they believed defeating subversion justified 
their methods and absolved them of criminal responsibility. 
 Issuing its final verdict in December 1985, the Federal Court of Appeals rejected the 
defense’s arguments. The chamber responded that the defendants’ actions were abusive. “There 
was no intensification of originally adequate means but rather illicit instruments,” explained the 
judges.156 They held that “combat should never escape the framework of the law.”157 The 
sentencing further clarified that the military juntas had access to legal measures to combat so-
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called subversives. According to the members of the Federal Court of Appeals, the dictatorship 
could have declared emergency zones, dictated public warnings, made summary judgements, and 
even applied death sentences.158 The former leaders had not employed these methods. 
 In its entirety, the judgement filled 868 pages. The judges sentenced General Jorge 
Videla and Admiral Eduardo Massera to life in prison; General Roberto Viola to seventeen years 
in prison; Admiral Armando Lambrushini to eight years in prison; and Brigadier General 
Osvaldo Agosti to four and one-half years in prison. The sentencing also stripped them of their 
military status. Those acquitted were the second junta’s Brigadier General Omar Graffigna, and 
the three leaders of the third junta, General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Jorge Anaya, and 
Brigadier General Lami Dozo.159 Members of the second and third juntas generally received 
lower sentences because more than eighty percent of the kidnappings occurred during the first 
two years of the dictatorship.160 
 Following the sentencing, the trial received praise from government officials across the 
political spectrum. Radical Party Deputy Leopoldo Moreau claimed the varied convictions 
proved the trial was not “politically-motivated.”161 Welcoming the verdicts, Peronist Party 
Deputy Carlos Grosso said the five convictions were “an important factor for the consolidation 
and stability of democracy.”162 However, some politicians and human rights activists expressed 
anger and disappointment. “Genocide has not been punished,” contended Luis Zamora, chief of 
the Movement towards Socialism. “[The government] tried genocide as if it were like stealing 
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chickens.”163 Hebe Pastor de Bonafini, President of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, had left 
the courtroom in protest after various junta members received acquittals.164  
 Particularly for those who had suffered personally, the sentencing appeared far too 
lenient. Emilio Mignone, President of the Center for Legal and Social Studies, maintained that 
“the sentencing [did] not satisfy the expectations of a democratic society.”165 Mignone had 
worked for the Ministry of Justice in the 1950s and later served as a specialist in education 
policy for the Organization of the American States. Despite a long history of public service, his 
involvement in the Argentine human rights movement did not begin until after the disappearance 
of his daughter, Mónica. She was a child psychologist and worked in the Santa María del Pueblo 
Church in a shanty town west of Buenos Aires. In the early morning of May 24, 1976, just two 
months after the military coup, plainclothes officers broke into the Mignone family home and 
took Mónica for questioning. Her family never saw her again.166 
 Despite conflicting reactions from the public, the verdicts represented an enormous 
policy success for President Alfonsín because convictions against former leaders had never 
happened in Argentina. However, the final ruling contained language that the administration did 
not expect. In point 30 of the verdict, the court held, “There exist subordinates who are not going 
to be exonerated by due obedience, and who are responsible for the known acts together with 
those who imparted the orders.”167 The court did not absolve lower-ranking officers of criminal 
responsibility, and asked that investigations continue in order to discover and punish the 
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perpetrators of kidnappings, torture, and murders. The Federal Court of Appeals reported that it 
would forward all criminal offenses discovered during the trial to the Supreme Council (which 
would resume jurisdiction over subsequent cases).168 
 The government faced a second wave of trials, whose prosecutions would descend 
throughout the chain of command, as a result of the language contained in point 30. The ruling 
risked aggravating growing tensions with the military and provincial courts. Up to this point, 
judges in the interior of the country had not initiated any trials within their jurisdiction.169 The 
inactivity of these courts risked reaching the statute of limitations on thousands of crimes and 
acquitting their perpetrators without trials.170 Thus, the Federal Chamber sought to accelerate 
pending cases through its verdict and call for continued investigations. 
 The inclusion of point 30 in the court’s decision shocked Alfonsín and his administration. 
He felt the ruling undermined the principle of due obedience. “[Point 30] opened the door for 
more prosecution,” said Carlos Santiago Nino, Deputy Assistant to the President and prominent 
legal scholar. The government had expected the trial of the juntas to bring a close to 
prosecutions, which had gone on for more than two years. Instead, trials would continue and 
affect officials of all ranks. 
 Point 30 frustrated the administration’s goals, but the justices felt that investigations must 
occur before exonerating subordinates. They asserted it was “ethically inadmissible to 
concentrate all the responsibility on five men and leave the rest free.” They rejected the idea of a 
predetermined number of guilty parties that would prevent future court proceedings. Despite the 
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court’s stance, which conflicted with the public desires of the president, the judges claimed that 
the president never pressured them. 171 “The judgement was something we rendered alone,” said 
Judge Gil Lavedra, a member of the Federal Court of Appeals.172 
Judicial Procedures in Argentina 
 The Alfonsín administration worried that the verdict in the trial of the juntas would lead 
to an uncontrollable surge in prosecutions. These fears stemmed from particularities of the 
Argentine judicial system. In Argentina, citizens can file complaints directly with the court 
without the presence of an attorney or a police report on file. The individual can also provide 
investigatory leads and introduce evidence. Once the court receives a charge, a magistrate must 
investigate the claims.173 
 Using these provisions for private prosecution, victims and their families could bring 
forward new cases. Human rights organizations such as the Permanent Assembly for Human 
Rights (which Alfonsín helped establish) and the Center for Legal and Social Studies assisted 
victims and their families in presenting charges and flooded the courts with denunciations 
following the return to democracy. Between February and August 1984, the number of charges 
filed against officers rose from thirty to two thousand.174 
 The particularities of the Argentine judicial system presented human rights groups with a 
direct role in opening criminal cases. They used this feature to their advantage. Mignone 
recognized that the volume of denunciations would take a decade or more for the courts to 
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resolve. However, he claimed, “My responsibility as the head of a human rights organization was 
to carry things to their extreme, without measuring the political consequences of doing so.”175 By 
flooding the courts with new cases, activists increasingly placed the president’s focus on the 
future of human rights trials. 
 The volume of cases risked overwhelming the judiciary and prompting retaliation from 
the armed forces. For this reason, President Alfonsín had hoped that the Federal Court of 
Appeals would rule in favor of the due obedience principle. Such precedent would exonerate 
defendants in many of the pending cases in order to decrease pressure on the judiciary and within 
the military. Without intervention, courts would take years to process files and begin 
proceedings. Thus, the accused would not receive a speedy trial, and their professional and legal 
status would remain unresolved during the process.176     
Conclusion 
 At the outset of Alfonsín’s presidency, he understood that his human rights agenda faced 
serious risks. The investigation of military officers accused of crimes could threaten the stability 
of civil-military relations if the entire institution felt vulnerable to human rights prosecution. 
Furthermore, prolonged trials could foster anxiety within the armed forces because the 
defendant’s future remained uncertain while proceedings continued. To mitigate these concerns, 
Alfonsín sought a small number of trials against the highest-ranking officers.  
 Alfonsín’s expectations for human rights prosecutions faced significant complications as 
a result of his emphasis on constitutional processes. In promoting strict compliance with the 
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separation of powers, the president had allowed the judiciary to act as an independent and equal 
branch of government. The courts enjoyed renewed independence and broader powers of review 
against the executive during Alfonsín’s presidency. President Alfonsín’s strict adherence to 
constitutional norms meant that he could not unilaterally control the implementation of his 
human rights program.  
 Although aware of these dangers, Alfonsín trusted the judiciary to honor the limits 
implicit in his human rights agenda. He had advocated for the acquittal of subordinates, who had 
merely followed orders, throughout his campaign and presidency. Despite the president’s 
frequent references to due obedience as a means of closure to legal proceedings, the Federal 
Court of Appeals did not decide in the government’s favor. Instead, the justices recognized that 
some subordinates would not benefit from due obedience. Only investigations and trials would 
determine who held criminal responsibility.   
 Alfonsín had expected the sentence to bring closure to human rights prosecutions. 
Instead, he faced the possibility of ongoing trials and increased backlash from the military. The 
court’s decision had ignored his public statements and undermined his plans. Without legal 
interpretation and precedent that supported his understanding of due obedience, the president’s 
human rights program risked failure. A surge in trials against low-ranking service members 
would likely antagonize the armed forces and lead to confrontations between the government and 
the military. This situation would eventually force Alfonsín to seek other legislative means to 
establish limits to human rights trials.  
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Chapter Four: Operation Dignity and the Demand for Amnesty Measures  
Some 400,000 people took to the streets of Buenos Aires during Semana Santa (Holy 
Week) of 1987. 177 However, they had not congregated for traditional Easter processionals and 
celebrations. Instead, the crowds converged on Plaza de Mayo in defense of the country’s 
nascent democracy. Various military units had rebelled and taken the nearby base of Campo de 
Mayo by force. In response, the multitude had gathered to send a message to the mutineers. They 
erupted in chants: “Don’t you dare, don’t you dare, if you do, we will burn the barracks. The 
people united will never be defeated!” 178 The rebellion represented the first serious threat to 
democracy since its return four years earlier in December 1983.  
 The uprisings of Semana Santa drew massive public attention to civil-military relations in 
Argentina, but hostility and mistrust had always defined the relationship between President 
Alfonsín and the armed forces. From the moment he announced his candidacy, Alfonsín had 
made his background as a human rights’ advocate central to his campaign. Thus, the main pillar 
of his platform was the promise to hold the armed forces accountable for illicit acts committed 
during their exercise of power.179 
As president, Alfonsín had delivered on this promise. He had ordered investigations into 
human rights abuses and detained the ex-leaders of the military juntas during his first week in 
office. By 1987, pending cases continued to mount against members of the armed forces. The 
military asserted that trials unfairly judged the institution for behavior conducted during a “war 
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on subversion.” As the scope of investigations extended across all levels of the armed forces, the 
government faced increased pressure to limit prosecutions and bring a definitive end to court 
procedures. 
The crisis of Semana Santa emerged from the tension created due to ongoing trials 
against military leaders and their subordinates. However, attributing the rebellion exclusively to 
this factor obscures the role of institutions beyond the executive and the military. Both the 
judiciary and the legislature had influenced the president’s human rights program during its 
transition from proposal to policy. This process had complicated Alfonsín’s agenda, thus playing 
a pivotal role in the conflict’s development and conclusion.  
During the standoff, President Alfonsín had refused to use force against the rebels at 
Campo de Mayo. He wanted to avoid violence, and he knew that the military generals could not 
guarantee that their troops would follow orders to fire against their own. Even if the soldiers 
cooperated, the president risked more than intra-service conflict. Approximately two thousand 
unarmed people had gathered at the rebel garrison to protest the uprising.180 The presence of 
civilians risked a violent confrontation with the mutineers and potential civilian deaths. Alfonsín 
hoped to prevent bloodshed, so he traveled to Campo de Mayo and personally negotiated a 
peaceful end to the rebellion.    
In the immediate aftermath of the uprising of Semana Santa, the public heralded 
President Alfonsín as a hero of democracy. This perception quickly faded with the passage of the 
Law of Due Obedience, which limited ongoing human rights trials. Traditionally, scholars have 
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regarded the law as a concession to military pressure.181 However, Alfonsín had outlined the 
principle of Due Obedience as early as his presidential campaign. His decision to postpone the 
law stemmed from political considerations rather than his position toward the military. Moving 
beyond a military-centered analysis, this chapter traces the rules, procedures, and institutions 
through which political actors must achieve their aims. 
The law’s delay gave the appearance of presidential weakness, but the rebellion had in 
fact helped Alfonsín harness bipartisan support in order to pass such a controversial policy. In 
framing Due Obedience as a concession to the military, previous scholarship has overlooked the 
role of democratic institutions. The judicial and legislative branches exercised greater autonomy, 
which constrained Alfonsín and complicated the execution of his policy proposals throughout his 
presidency. The president could not achieve his goals without the cooperation of other political 
actors because they acted as a genuine check on the executive’s authority. Consequently, this 
period saw the president’s power diminished, but this shift represented a greater adherence to 
democratic practices and the rule of law.   
The limits on Alfonsín’s capacity to determine policy stemmed from his own efforts to 
reinvigorate the constitution. Because he assumed the presidency in a period of transition, 
Alfonsín believed his government would set a precedent for the newly restored democracy. Thus, 
he exercised extreme caution and sought to model democratic practices. Alfonsín tried to avoid 
any appearance of interfering with autonomy of the judiciary or the legislature. This adherence to 
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the separation of powers ended a history of highly presidential governments and sought to further 
consolidate democracy.    
 Hoping to break with the country’s history of hyper-presidentialism, Alfonsín encouraged 
respect for the separation of powers and for the system of checks and balances. This belief in 
institutional autonomy meant a loss of presidential power. Alfonsín could propose legislation, 
but Congress retained the right to modify or reject a bill. If the proposal became law, the courts 
had the power to challenge its validity or interpret it broadly. Both governmental branches 
exercised independence and influenced his policies. Thus, he could not unilaterally determine a 
human rights program without violating his commitment to democratic processes. Each branch 
of the government controlled some aspect of policy development, so the trials produced 
unintended effects. Yet, these same political institutions, when faced with a national crisis, 
compromised across party lines to diminish the military threat. Considering this unprecedented 
level of cooperation, the Semana Santa Rebellion represented not only the first serious threat to 
the government but also the extent to which country had begun consolidating democracy.  
Full Stop  
 Following the trial of the juntas, pending cases for crimes committed during the Dirty 
War increased from 1,700 in December 1985 to 3,000 by mid-1986.182 The rising number of 
accusations against lower ranking military members provoked greater hostility than the 
prosecution of the top leaders. “While the generals were in jail, the lieutenants didn’t give a 
damn,” noted Judge Andrés D’Alessio, who had served on the trial of the juntas, “But when they 
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cite low-ranking officers, they all feel, ‘They’re coming for me.’”183 Thus, judicial action against 
lower officers antagonized the entirety of the armed forces and further damaged civil military 
relations.  
 Discontent within the army became increasingly evident as pending accusations 
multiplied. In April 1986, pamphlets circulated within the army that accused the Alfonsín 
government of “discrediting the [military] institution through human rights campaigns,” and 
called upon soldiers to join an “army in resistance.”184 The pamphlets outlined multiple phases of 
opposition designed to put pressure on the government. This campaign confirmed information 
gathered by foreign and domestic intelligence sources, which claimed retired and active army 
officers sought to undermine and eventually remove President Alfonsín.185   
 As evidence of resistance within the armed forces circulated throughout the press, 
Alfonsín faced growing pressure to address the situation. He met with members of the Supreme 
Court, legal advisers Jaime Malamud Goti and Ricardo Entelman, Secretary of Justice Ideler 
Tonelli, Minister of Defense Germán López, and Minister of the Interior Antonio Tróccoli to 
discuss the growing number of trials and indictments.186 Alfonsín hoped to expedite court 
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procedures even as ongoing prosecutions promoted disorder and damaged military morale.187 He 
asked Malamud and Entelman in October 1986 to draft a proposal that would shorten the statute 
of limitations.188 The result, known as the Full Stop Law, established a period of sixty days to 
present charges against the armed forces. After the passage of sixty days, any such claims would 
expire. Congress enacted the Full Stop Law on December 23, 1986.  
 Although Full Stop shortened the statute of limitations, Alfonsín and his advisers did not 
intend the law to serve as a concession to the military. Rather, the president sought to increase 
pressure on the judicial branch, which had not begun to process more than 3,000 pending cases. 
However, opponents of the law suspected that the president had designed Full Stop as a 
mechanism for limiting trials by offering a short period to present charges. This timeframe also 
partially overlapped with the end of the year judicial recess, and human rights activists worried 
this break would make it more difficult to submit accusations before the deadline.189 Alfonsín 
and his closest advisers tried to counteract this narrative and reassure the public that they did not 
expect the measure to impede justice. Carlos Nino, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
prominent legal scholar, claimed the law would help accelerate the trials as cases had rapidly 
multiplied, and the courts remained inactive.190  
 Alfonsín reinforced this argument during his State of the Union Address in 1986. “The 
idea is to speed up processes that, due to the delay in their processing, constitute a denial of 
justice, both for the victims of the events denounced and for the accused themselves,” asserted 
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the president.191 The Argentine judiciary is notoriously slow, and the growing caseload 
threatened to overwhelm the courts. Emilio Mignone, President of the Center for Legal and 
Social Studies, estimated that the courts would take ten or more years to process existing human 
rights cases.192 The inaction of provincial courts threatened to prolong an already lengthy 
process, and the legal status of defendants would remain in limbo for years. Without his 
intervention, the president feared that the courts would indefinitely delay proceedings.  
 Alfonsín did not imagine Full Stop as a means to avoid trials but rather to fast-track legal 
proceedings. Federal courts within the provinces had postponed judicial action for months and 
even years. Between December 1983 and January 1986, courts in the interior provinces had not 
initiated a single trial within their jurisdictions.193 Courts outside of Buenos Aires were often 
reluctant to press charges against military officers because local judges tended to be more 
conservative and held close family ties to military officers. The military juntas had also 
appointed many of the judges serving within the interior provinces.194 By enacting a shorter 
statute of limitations, President Alfonsín believed that the subsequent public pressure and intense 
scrutiny would force courts throughout the country to act.   
 The Full Stop Law provoked an outburst of judicial action. The courts accelerated their 
activity, and the Federal Chambers of Córdoba, Bahía Blanca, Tucumán, Rosario, Mendoza, 
Comodoro Rivadavia, and La Plata suspended January’s recess to process pending cases.195 As a 
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result of these efforts, the courts had indicted more than 300 senior military officers, apart from 
those already convicted or detained, by the February 23, 1987, deadline established by Full 
Stop.196  
 The law had caused an outburst of work because the courts recognized that the judiciary’s 
legitimacy would suffer if it failed to act during the short time frame given to process cases. 
Throughout the trial of the juntas, witnesses had drawn attention to the judicial system’s failures 
during the Dirty War. Eduardo Rabossi, Deputy Minister of Human Rights and member of the 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, testified that the institution had not 
functioned under the military dictatorship.197 Further condemning the courts, Senator Antonio 
Berhongaray of the Radical Party claimed, “This trial not only judges the military but also the 
judiciary in terms of its effectiveness and the action that it took during the process.”198 Sharp 
public criticism combined with the president’s stricter timeline compelled the courts to initiate 
proceedings and avoid further damage to its legitimacy.    
Insurrection in Córdoba 
In passing the Full Stop Law, Alfonsín forced the judiciary to act on cases it had allowed 
to sit in the docket. However, the measure’s results would exceed his expectations. He and his 
advisors imagined the short period established by the statute of limitations would compel judges 
to prioritize the most abhorrent crimes. Instead, the justices exercised little oversight. Graciela 
Meijide, mother of a disappeared child and member of the National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons, accused the judiciary of intentionally complicating the situation by 
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interpreting and applying Full Stop broadly. “The judges prosecuted up to the doorman. To 
damage Alfonsín,” she alleged. “They knew how it would go over in the military.”199 By citing 
defendants indiscriminately, court proceedings reached all levels of the armed forces and 
provoked widespread fear and discontent.  
The judiciary’s broad application of Full Stop overwhelmed court dockets but avoided 
deciding on the validity of another key proposition—due obedience. Since his campaign, 
Alfonsín had maintained this proposal, which derived from article 514 of the Argentine military 
code. His interpretation of this statute established three levels of responsibility that distinguished 
who gave orders from those who followed them. If a soldier followed orders and did not exceed 
them for personal benefit, then that subordinate would not face investigation or trial.200  
The principle of due obedience stemmed from the military code, but many judges felt it 
was a political rather than judicial defense strategy. Thus, they refused to apply due obedience 
while processing cases, even if this meant adding hundreds of cases to their dockets. Minister of 
Defense Horacio Jaunarena felt that the judicial response rejected the responsibility of resolving 
the issue of ongoing trials. Instead, he claimed that the judges challenged “the politicians to put 
their cards on the table.”201 If the courts overloaded their trial calendars, they expected that the 
ensuing chaos would compel the president to solve the question of due obedience through 
legislative, rather than judicial, means.    
Tensions between the armed forces and the government reached a climax after charges 
against lower-ranking military members increased. A military rebellion began in Córdoba, some 
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400 miles northwest of the capital. The Federal Court of Córdoba had summoned Major Ernesto 
Barreiro for questioning about allegations that he took part in the torture of political detainees 
during the military dictatorship. However, Barreiro objected to civilian jurisdiction over his 
proceedings. On April 14, 1987, he reported to his superior that he would not appear in court and 
that he would not “humiliate the uniform.”202 
 Barreiro believed the trials represented a political attack against soldiers who had served 
honorably during a war on terrorism, and he rejected the prosecution of subordinates. In contrast, 
he did not object to the trial of the juntas. “When you lose, there’s a price,” Barreiro explained.  
“We had to try to move on with the lowest possible cost.”203 He justified this stance because 
subordinates, unlike the top brass, had “limited themselves to completing orders.”204 Following 
this reasoning, Barreiro argued that charges against lower-ranking service members persecuted 
those who had merely performed their duty. 
When news of Major Barreiro’s stance reached the federal court, authorities declared him 
a rebel and ordered the federal police to detain him. 205 He subsequently took refuge at a military 
base near Córdoba, where he garnered the support of some 130 officers and soldiers.206 Even 
those who did not explicitly support Barreiro’s actions refused to move against him. General 
Antonino Fichera, commander of the Córdoba troops, reported that officers under his command 
disobeyed orders to arrest Major Barreiro. They believed he was armed, and Fichera explained 
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that his subordinates “resist[ed] using arms against a comrade.”207 Barreiro’s individual act of 
insubordination had spread throughout the barracks in Córdoba and signaled widespread anger 
toward ongoing human rights trials. 
Operation Dignity 
The situation quickly escalated, and the rebellion reached Buenos Aires on April 16. 
Taking Campo de Mayo Base by force, a group of rebels known as las carapintadas (called the 
painted faces for their use of military camouflage) expressed solidarity with Barreiro’s cause. 
Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, a decorated veteran of the Falklands War, left his post in 
Misiones province (600 miles north of Buenos Aires) to assume command of the mutineers at 
Campo de Mayo. He had distinguished himself during the war as the leader of the 602 
Commando Company, the army’s elite fighting unit.208   
Despite his leadership in the carapintadas rebellion, Rico had no known ties to the war 
against subversion and faced no charges for human rights violations. He believed that the 
military’s leadership had failed to protect the institution against attacks from the government. 
The rebellion sough to restore honor and respect toward the military, and the mutineers referred 
to their revolt as Operation Dignity. Rico and his supporters alleged that the human rights trials 
were an insult to an institution that had protected the country from terrorists. Therefore, they 
demanded a blanket amnesty law and an end to prosecutions.209 
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 Facing an organized rebellion, President Alfonsín called a special session of Congress on 
April 16, three days before Easter Sunday. He had convoked the legislature in defense of 
democracy, and approximately 400,000 Argentines gathered in the streets to show their 
support.210 “The chiefs and officers of the armed forces have only one obligation before them: to 
obey the orders of their superiors and the supreme commander,” Alfonsín declared on national 
television, “There is nothing to negotiate, much less the autonomous and legitimate decisions of 
the judiciary.”211 Those present in Congress, as well as those demonstrating outside, received the 
president’s words with enthusiasm and reaffirmed their support for the democratic order.212 
 The following morning, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, leader of the carapintadas, met 
with journalists. Surrounded by soldiers armed and dressed for battle, he responded to the 
president’s message. Rico claimed this rebellion was not “a confrontation between dictatorship 
and democracy, nor against the government of Doctor Alfonsín.”213 Instead, the rebels pointed to 
internal problems within the armed forces. The carapintadas believed that the top brass had 
failed to protect their subordinates against prosecution, which “generated a state of mistrust, 
indiscipline, lack of prestige, and disgrace within the armed forces.”214 Continued court 
procedures placed the army’s future in jeopardy.   
The army mutineers continually stressed in public statements that their actions did not 
seek a military coup but rather they sought rapid and decisive actions from the government 
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regarding the investigation of subordinates and the ongoing human rights trials. “The army . . . 
has paid a high price for—we will recognize it—mistakes,” claimed Rico, “But we cannot 
continue to bear the guilt of the top brass. . . . We had no capacity to decide.”215 Rico’s 
justification of the rebellion mirrored that of Major Barreiro and took up the banner of due 
obedience. 
 The public statements of Lieutenant Colonel Rico and Major Barreiro indicated that the 
middle ranks felt betrayed not only by the democratic government but also by their leaders. In 
fact, Rico accused the generals of forgetting “the army, the country, and the subordinates.”216 
The middle-ranking officers believed that the high command had cooperated with the 
antagonistic policies of the government in order to advance their own careers at the expense of 
their subordinates. As a result of this perceived betrayal, the carapintadas had broken rank. “All 
hopes that the present Army leadership will stop the injustices and humiliations that the Armed 
Forces have been subjected to have extinguished,” declared Lieutenant Colonel Rico.217 Rico and 
his fellow mutineers expressed their desire for direct negotiations with the civilian government.  
 With the situation intensifying, Alfonsín sent Minister of Defense Jaunarena to Campo de 
Mayo on April 17. He instructed Jaunarena to de-escalate the situation without resorting to the 
use of force, but the rebels grew increasingly combative. Responding to appeals to surrender, 
Major Barreiro issued a warning to his commanding general. “I have grenades and my shotgun, 
so I’m going to die fighting,” he said.218 The threat of violence caused further disintegration of 
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relations between the top brass and middle ranks, and the government feared the possibility of a 
civil war.219 
The mutineers led by Rico in Campo de Mayo adopted a similarly combative stance. The 
carapintadas stressed that their rebellion had exercised restraint thus far, but they, along with 
other units, stood ready to respond to any show of force. “The military escalation that will ensue 
and all its consequences will be the sole responsibility of the generals,” Rico warned.220 The 
rebels refused to back down and their aggressive attitude threatened to unleash a wave of 
violence to various military units throughout the country.   
The government’s position continued to deteriorate over the course of the weekend. 
General Ernesto Alais, commander of the Second Corps, gathered troops at Campo de Mayo on 
Saturday, April 18. Thousands of unarmed civilians congregated outside and attempted to enter 
the garrison to put pressure on the commandos. Alais threatened to use cannons to remove the 
rebels. “As soon as you do so,” Rico responded, “I will throw a mortar into the crowd, and then 
you can explain that it wasn’t your misdirected cannon.”221 The mutineers understood that the 
president wanted to avoid bloodshed, so they leveraged the threat of violence throughout the 
conflict. They correctly assumed the top brass was unlikely to initiate armed conflict in order to 
avoid escalating the situation.  
The mutineers’ willingness to resort to violence limited the president’s ability to resolve 
the crisis quickly, but Alfonsín thought he could harness public support to overcome the 
rebellion. Throughout the weekend, crowds had maintained vigil in the country’s major plazas. 
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National newspapers claimed this mobilization in support of democracy was the largest in the 
country’s history.222 These demonstrations communicated the public’s disapproval of the rebels’ 
cause and its readiness to take action for the civilian government.   
Alfonsín recognized the massive outpouring of support as a significant advantage, and he 
called on political and social leaders to publicly express their loyalty to the constitutional order. 
Actors from across the political spectrum gathered at the Casa Rosada to endorse an “Act in 
Defense of Democracy.”223 Prior to the signing, the Minister of the Interior Antonio Tróccoli 
read the text aloud. The pact reaffirmed their commitment to democratic principles and included 
a promise to recognize “various levels of responsibility.”224 By including this wording within the 
“Act in Defense of Democracy,” President Alfonsín obtained public endorsement of due 
obedience from prominent leaders and members of the opposition.  
The carapintadas’ position remained firm despite widespread protests against the rebels 
and a unified civilian front. They refused to surrender without speaking to the president. After 
two days of negotiation, the Minister of Defense, Jaunarena, called Alfonsín on April 19, and 
expressed the gravity of the situation. “Everything failed,” he said, “They are out of control.”225 
Rico believed that the president would submit to a blanket amnesty law that pardoned all but the 
junta leaders in order to avoid a prolonged conflict with the military. Holding out for a 
comprehensive amnesty, Rico refused to submit to Jaunarena’s demands. Instead, he warned that 
he was prepared to die.226  
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The news from Campo de Mayo convinced Alfonsín that he needed to meet with 
Lieutenant Colonel Rico directly. A large crowd had gathered outside the Casa Rosada on this 
Easter Sunday. The president, accompanied by Peronist Party leaders, took to the balcony before 
departing. “We are risking our future, the future of our children, we are risking bloodshed among 
brothers,” he warned the crowd.227 Alfonsín explained that he would travel to Campo de Mayo 
and personally demand the rebels’ surrender in hopes of avoiding more chaos. “Wait for me. Do 
not move,” he urged the multitude. “God willing, I will be back soon with an answer. Then you 
can go home, kiss your children and tell them that we have ensured for them a future of 
freedom.”228 Following this address, he said a prayer in the chapel of the Casa Rosada. He then 
boarded a helicopter destined for Campo de Mayo Base. As his helicopter flew over the crowd, 
they began to sing the national anthem.229 
That evening Alfonsín returned to the Casa Rosada surrounded by the ministers of the 
interior and defense, Peronist party leaders, and some members of the military. Addressing the 
crowd in Plaza de Mayo, he reported that those involved in the insurrection would be arrested 
and subjected to court proceedings. “The house is in order and there is no bloodshed in 
Argentina,” he assured the multitude. “I ask the people in Campo de Mayo to leave. And I 
request all of you: Go to your homes to kiss your children; to celebrate Easter in Argentina in 
peace.”230 Alfonsín had succeeded in negotiating a peaceful surrender, and the public heralded 
him as a defender of democracy. 
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Due Obedience 
The euphoria following the president’s Easter proclamation quickly dissipated. As details 
of his private meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Rico at Campo de Mayo became public, the 
government’s position deteriorated. Brigadier Héctor Panzardi, a military advisor who 
accompanied Alfonsín to the base, explained that the president had assured Rico that the 
Supreme Court would define the levels of criminal responsibility.231 A federal judge had already 
initiated criminal proceedings against participants in the uprising, and Lieutenant Colonel Rico 
demanded immunity for everyone but himself. Alfonsín rejected this request but guaranteed 
military jurisdiction for those who would now face mutiny charges for their participation in the 
Semana Santa rebellion.232 This agreement did not affect trials related to crimes committed 
during the dictatorship. However, human rights organizations viewed the overall effects of this 
negotiation as a hidden amnesty for the armed forces while the military objected to the 
continuation of trials in progress.  
The situation further deteriorated when the Executive sent a proposal for the Due 
Obedience Law to Congress on May 13, 1987. The measure exempted from prosecution all 
military persons below the level of colonel. Alfonsín acknowledged that the law would have far-
reaching effects, which would allow some of those who committed serious crimes to escape 
prosecution. However, he held that criminal responsibility corresponded “to those who 
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conceived this aberrant inhuman plan, and ordered that it be carried out.”  233 Due Obedience 
sought to define the scope of criminal, not moral, guilt. 
Despite the proximity between the announcement of Due Obedience and the military 
uprisings, Alfonsín insisted that growing tensions with the military did not motivate the policy. 
Instead, he pointed toward statements made during his electoral campaign. He had maintained as 
early as 1983 that those following orders had acted “in a climate that instilled in them the 
conviction that the acts they carried out were legitimate.”234 The coercive environment in which 
abuses occurred meant that those who followed orders “should be considered as having acted 
under due obedience.”235 
Alfonsín claimed the rebellion of Semana Santa had not motivated Due Obedience, but 
he deemed the policy necessary for democratic consolidation. The rising number of accusations 
facing the armed forces complicated the institution’s reintegration into democratic society. 
“During the crisis of Holy week, our country was close to a confrontation whose consequences 
still rattle us,” claimed Alfonsín in a national address, “We were on the brink of civil war.” 236 
The rebellion had demonstrated the fragility of the country’s democracy. The Law of Due 
Obedience sought to reaffirm the limits implicit in the human rights project proposed by 
Alfonsín as a presidential candidate. 
Human rights organizations unanimously rejected the president’s justification for 
restricting prosecutions. In response to the Due Obedience Bill’s debate in Congress, 
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approximately 8,000 people gathered to protest. March organizers accused the president of 
mutilating democracy “under the pretext of saving it.”237 The Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo, a 
human rights organization dedicated to locating their disappeared children and grandchildren, 
warned the president that “negotiating with murderers” would not lead to peace.238 Those who 
opposed the principle of Due Obedience believed the law excused blind obedience and granted 
an amnesty to individuals guilty of serious crimes.  
Despite harsh public reception of the proposal, Congress approved and enacted Due 
Obedience on June 6, 1987. The law created a nearly irrefutable defense for middle and lower 
rank officers and exempted from prosecution all those who did not have decision-making power 
within the armed forces. However, Due Obedience did not apply to those who exceeded orders 
or committed crimes of rape, kidnapping, concealment of children, and appropriation of 
property.239  
President Alfonsín faced strong opposition in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies 
when he proposed Due Obedience. The Radical Party only held 39 percent of Senate seats and 
just over 50 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.240 Even within Alfonsín’s party, he 
encountered difficulty in securing votes. Radical Senator Adolfo Gass publicly struggled with his 
decision. During the dictatorship, Gass had gone into exile after the disappearance of his son. 
 
237 “8,000 Protest Against Due Obedience Bill,’” Buenos Aires DYN (May 21, 1987), Trans. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, FBIS-LAM-87-093, May 22, 1987, B1. 
238 Children often disappeared at the same time as their parents. The police and military task forces also kidnapped 
pregnant women, who gave birth while held in clandestine detention centers. In most cases, relatives did not learn 
the fate of the parents or children. The Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo sought to locate their adult children as well 
as their grandchildren. “Senator Says Obedience Bill Could Become Amnesty,” Buenos Aires Herald (May 18, 
1987), Trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, FBIS-LAM-87-097, May 
20, 1987, B1.  
239 Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 101. 
240 Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial Politics in Argentina (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 61. 
 72 
The loss of his child at the hands of the armed forces made it difficult for Senator Gass to vote in 
favor of the Due Obedience Law, but he ultimately felt that “there [was] no other choice.”241 
Gass and many Peronist congressman harshly criticized the measure, but the events of Semana 
Santa convinced them to cooperate with the president and enable its passage into law. 
Later that month, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Due Obedience. The 
members of the court defended the measure’s validity because Due Obedience derived from law 
and legal precedent in place when the incidents occurred.242 Any rulings that did not respect the 
principle of Due Obedience would unjustly punish people through retroactive application of the 
law. The court also held that it did not need to determine whether the law served as an “amnesty 
in disguise” because Congress had the power to issue pardons.243 
Alfonsín suffered grave political repercussions even though the Supreme Court upheld 
the law’s legitimacy. Sectors of the human rights movement accused the president of abandoning 
his original stance on trials. Many Argentines suspected Alfonsín of bowing to military pressure 
despite his claims to the contrary. He had suppressed the insurrection without exceeding the 
bounds of his office, but many interpreted his methods as weakness.  
President Alfonsín had advocated for the application of due obedience as early as he had 
called for prosecution. In the early stages of human rights trials, he adopted a “wait and see” 
approach. He anticipated that the courts would rule in favor of due obedience and help establish 
legal precedent for this defense. Military uprisings simply forced him to act decisively and push 
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the proposal through Congress. The president could no longer afford to await the judiciary’s 
decision.  
Conclusion 
President Alfonsín understood his government was unlikely to survive if judicial action 
continued indefinitely. Attempting to mitigate this risk, Alfonsín had outlined a human rights 
program that focused on the architects of the dictatorship’s repressive plan. However, the nature 
of democratic governance meant that other institutions, particularly the judiciary and Congress, 
would influence his policies. Human rights prosecutions escaped the president’s control due to 
the consequences of the transition from proposal to implementation.  
Alfonsín’s subsequent promulgation of the laws of Full Stop and Due Obedience sought 
to diminish the unintended outcomes of the policymaking process. Both laws reduced the scope 
of future trials in an effort to prevent military unrest, but they did not significantly compromise 
his original categories of criminal responsibility. Responding to the challenges of establishing 
democracy, Alfonsín had to make difficult decisions in order to ensure that the armed forces 
would not interrupt the civilian government as had happened in prior periods of democratic 
control.  
The crisis of Semana Santa had challenged the president’s authority, but the event’s 
aftermath revealed a newfound commitment to democracy among Argentines. The rebellion 
created a heightened sense of urgency, which ultimately provided greater opportunity for the 
Congress to successfully pass Due Obedience. Prior to the uprising, Alfonsín lacked political 
consensus regarding the Law of Due Obedience. However, the carapintadas armed movement 
had produced a climate of fear and allowed the president to highlight the necessity of 
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conciliatory measures toward the military. In framing Due Obedience as a means to protect 
democratic stability, Alfonsín formed a sufficient majority within the senate and chamber of 
deputies to ensure its passage.  Thus, Alfonsín ultimately achieved his policy aims without 
undermining the autonomy of the judiciary or the legislature. In a country prone to instability, 
this was an important step in establishing faith in democratic processes and institutions.   
 75 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Alfonsín’s presidency marked the return of democracy to Argentina. Assuming office in 
the wake of a brutal dictatorship, he inherited a burdensome legacy. The armed forces had 
ushered in a period of unprecedented violence after coming to power in 1976. In the following 
seven years, military task forces carried out clandestine arrests and “disappeared” approximately 
30,000 individuals. “Many people do not know what it means to live under the rule of the 
Constitution and the law,” declared Alfonsín during his inaugural address, “but now we all know 
what it means to live outside the framework of the Constitution and the law.”244 He promised 
that his administration would restore the democratic system and respect constitutional norms. 
As the first president elected by the people in ten years, Alfonsín felt that his presidency 
had not only to establish democracy but also to ensure its survival beyond his term in office. He 
had pledged throughout the campaign that the 1853 Constitution would guide his administration 
and the restoration of democracy. Closing his speeches with the Preamble to the Constitution, 
Alfonsín promised the country that he would “secure the blessing of liberty for ourselves, for our 
posterity, and for all men that wish to dwell on Argentine soil.” The recitation of the Preamble 
became a fixture of Alfonsín’s campaign appearances, and he would call on the crowd to join 
him in this “secular prayer.”  
Alfonsín’s appeals to constitutional practices helped cement his image as a true democrat. 
He wanted to assure voters that his presidency would bring an end to military coups, but he 
recognized that civilian governments also held blame for the rise of authoritarianism. Alfonsín 
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acknowledged that democratically elected presidents had abused their power and eroded the 
autonomy of the judiciary and legislature. Such practices damaged democratic practices, and 
Alfonsín pledged that his administration would overcome this history of hyper-presidentialism 
through strict adherence to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.  
Alfonsín’s constitutional principles secured an impressive electoral victory, but they 
limited his capacity to lead. By emphasizing the need for checks on presidential control, Alfonsín 
empowered the judiciary to act as a strong and independent force within the government. The 
courts showed a willingness to challenge President Alfonsín, and this autonomy provided uneven 
policy victories for the executive. In a democratic system, Alfonsín could not guarantee the 
success of his proposals, but he resisted using the weight of his office to enforce his political 
interests. Alfonsín’s rejection of Argentina’s hyper-presidential system sought to restore 
democratic norms. 
President Alfonsín believed the first step in establishing and preserving democracy was 
restoring faith in democratic processes and institutions. He sought to rebuild such trust by 
pursuing an end to impunity rather than continuing a tradition of complete amnesty for abusive 
military dictators. The fragile state of democracy in 1983 made his ambitions difficult to achieve. 
The armed forces remained an influential institution within Argentina, and prolonged trials 
risked provoking military protest. 
Hoping to preserve democratic stability, Alfonsín tried to maintain a balance between 
justice and impunity through the use of criminal prosecutions and a truth commission. The trial 
of the military generals showed the power of democratic processes to condemn illegal acts, even 
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when performed by former leaders. This was an important act in a country prone to military 
intervention and the first step in establishing greater civilian control over the armed forces. 
The trial of the juntas succeeded despite military defiance, but President Alfonsín 
understood that his human rights program would fail if judicial action continued indefinitely. 
Ongoing trials implicated officers at all levels of military hierarchy and kept information about 
the armed forces’ human rights abuses in the news. Such negative attention angered the military 
and motivated Alfonsín to limit the trials. However, the nature of democratic governance meant 
that other institutions would influence his plans. The president ultimately lost control of the 
extent of human rights prosecutions during the transition from policy to implementation.  
The crisis of Semana Santa highlights the consequences of diminished executive 
autonomy. Soldiers, fearing prosecution, demanded the president protect them from lengthy 
judicial processes. They were no longer willing to wait for the courts to decide their fate. Facing 
an open rebellion, Alfonsín needed to act decisively. His subsequent promulgation of the Due 
Obedience Law attempted to mitigate the unintended consequences of the policymaking process. 
He envisioned the measure as protection against military insurrection and government instability. 
Responding to the challenges of establishing democracy, Alfonsín had to make difficult 
decisions in order to ensure that the armed forces would not interrupt democracy as had 
happened in prior periods of civilian rule. The resulting declaration of Due Obedience reduced 
the scope of future trials in an effort to prevent military intervention.   
In effect, Alfonsín’s human rights program pioneered the use of high-level domestic 
prosecutions in Latin America but pursued limited trials of lower-ranking officers. More 
important than the extent of legal proceedings, however, the president achieved these policy 
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goals without violating the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. This 
commitment to constitutional norms, which previous governments rarely honored, promoted 
democratic values. Thus, Alfonsín’s administration used legal means to overcome a history of 
authoritarianism.  
Although President Alfonsín achieved his policy victories within the constitutional 
framework and with the cooperation of other governmental branches, his methods did not shield 
him from criticism. Human rights organizations fiercely condemned the passage of Due 
Obedience. The Center for Legal and Social Studies charged that the measures “insult[ed] the 
moral conscience of the nation.”245 Its members believed that Alfonsín had abandoned his 
electoral campaign promise to hold the military accountable. “We do not want vengeance,” said 
the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, “but will continue to seek justice.”246   
The Mothers’ pursuit of justice eventually overcame the Due Obedience Law. Twenty 
years after the restoration of democracy, the measure faced renewed scrutiny. Néstor Kirchner, a 
member of the Peronist Party, won the presidency in May 2003 on a platform that emphasized 
human dignity and an end to impunity. “We are all sons and daughters of the Mothers and 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo,” he reminded Argentines in his inaugural address.247 To 
honor the Mothers and Grandmothers’ cause, he immediately pushed for the annulment of Due 
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Obedience and the earlier Full Stop Law.248 The proposal inspired a new wave of criticism of the 
decisions of President Alfonsín, who had remained an active figure in Argentine politics. 
 Some within the Radical Party viewed the debate as an attack on Alfonsín’s legacy. The 
former president felt compelled to comment on the circumstances that led him to decree such 
laws. “Argentina sensed that [the nation] was living, and indeed lived, one of the deepest crises 
in its history.” claimed Alfonsín. “It was rumored that [Argentina] was facing the abyss; there 
was talk of chaos, anarchy, and there was even talk of national dissolution.”249 During the crisis, 
he believed he faced a choice between democracy and large scale prosecution for human rights 
abuses. Alfonsín chose to protect democracy because he understood that only democracy could 
ensure the protection of human rights in the future.   
Alfonsín maintained that political circumstances in 1987 demanded a measure like Due 
Obedience, but he acknowledged that times had changed. “Today, the Argentine people have 
elected a new president. . . . He must decide, on the constitutional level if . . . it is necessary or 
not to preserve these laws, and if he decides it is not, it shall mean that democracy is permanently 
consolidated,” declared Alfonsín.250 He did not view the potential annulment of Full Stop and 
Due Obedience in 2003 as an attack on his politics or moral character. Instead, he recognized the 
repeal of these laws as a final step in strengthening democracy and shared that proof of this 
consolidation would make him “the happiest man on earth.”251   
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The Argentine Congress repealed Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws in August 2003, 
and the Supreme Court upheld this decision in June 2005.252 Some view the annulment of these 
laws as evidence of their futility, but this criticism diminishes the threats facing the Alfonsín 
administration in the 1980s. Prior to his presidency, military dictatorships had followed one after 
another for more than half a century. Each coup marked shorter intervals of democratic stability 
and longer periods of military rule.253 The Full Stop and Due Obedience measures sought to end 
this cycle of instability and ensure a lasting democracy. 
Alfonsín’s politics, including these unpopular measures, helped create a society in which 
democracy was eventually strong enough to fully prosecute human rights violations. Alfonsín 
won uneven policy victories in his human rights program during his presidency. Trials exceeded 
his expectations, and military unrest forced him to pursue legislative means to limit future 
prosecutions. Despite suffering political losses, Alfonsín never abandoned his constitutional 
principles in order to advance his own interests. Such acts modeled democratic leadership and 
helped consolidate democracy.  
Through this difficult and often criticized process, Alfonsín arrived at the elections of 
1989 and successfully transferred power to the opposing party. Few Argentine presidents had 
achieved this feat, but Alfonsín received little praise for the peaceful transfer. Economic 
concerns had forced him to renounce the presidency three months early. By July 1989, when 
Alfonsín left office, monthly inflation had reached 200 percent. His last month in office 
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witnessed riots and looting of supermarkets.254 Economic crises historically had shattered public 
confidence in the government and prompted military intervention. However, Argentines 
demonstrated a renewed faith in democracy. In the midst of hyperinflation and record level 
unemployment, 79 percent of those polled favored democracy over other alternatives.255 Public 
discontent with the administration and its policies had not shaken their commitment to the 
democratic system.      
 Alfonsín’s early exit tarnished his presidential legacy in the inauguration’s immediate 
aftermath but ultimately sought to respect the will of the people. Peronist Carlos Menem had 
secured a sweeping victory against Radical Eduardo Angeloz in May 1989, and Argentines 
increasingly pushed for new leadership as the economy rapidly declined. Alfonsín believed that 
staying in office until December would “subordinate the country’s fate to personal ego.”256 Thus, 
he chose to sacrifice the remaining months in his term to ensure the peaceful transfer of power 
between opposing parties.  
Although Alfonsín did not finish his term, his presidency achieved its ultimate goal—the 
preservation of democracy. The 1989 election occurred in the midst of chaos but marked the 
beginning of Argentina’s longest period of democratic stability. “Men succeed or fail, but it is 
[their] ideas that transform themselves into torches that keep democracy alive,” affirmed 
Alfonsín at his last public appearance in 2008.257 Nearing the end of Alfonsín’s life, Argentines 
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affectionately referred to him as the “father of democracy.” His presidency had come to 
symbolize not only the return of democracy to Argentina but also a lasting commitment to the 
democratic order. In the nearly forty years since Alfonsín won the presidency, Argentina has 
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